The soft law approach: Commission rule-making in the EU's state aid regime

Cini, Michelle

doi:10.1080/13501760110041541

Cited by 95 publications

(53 citation statements)

References 2 publications

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“…Some authors [9,11,16] view soft law instruments as limited to non-binding norms with legal relevance. Other authors [2,14] define them as involving binding norms with a soft dimension. Others [22] combine the two views in an attempt at doing justice to all types of obligations which can be distinguished for soft law instruments, as well as the rights that the actors involved can enjoy.…”

Section: Evading the Burden Of Proof In European Union Soft Law… 85mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In particular, through an AMT analysis, we can shed light on the EU's implicit starting points on which the Commission relies, on the extent to which they might be shared by the addressees and eventually on how functional these starting points might be for persuading Member States to comply with the prescribed course of action. By doing so, we provide an explanation of the various cases of evasion of the burden of proof which occurs by making use of implicit starting points that might not be accepted by 2 Evading the burden of proof is interpreted here as not fully accepting the commitment to justify one's standpoint in front of the addressee (in this case, Member States). Evading the burden of proof can be strategically exploited to persuade the addressee without mentioning those aspects that could potentially weaken one's case.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Second, we will explain how and why the way in which the arguments are combined in this complex pattern could be potentially persuasive for the Member States despite the legally non-binding character of recommendations. We will show that the European Commission tries to persuade the Member States to take new measures by evading the burden of proof 2 imposed by the legislative framework. At a more specific level of analysis, we will delve into the implicit premises in the argumentation, which enable us to identify cases of evasion of the burden of proof due to the Commission's use of implicit starting points which might not be accepted by the Member States.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evading the Burden of Proof in European Union Soft Law Instruments: The Case of Commission Recommendations

Andone

Greco

2017

Int J Semiot Law

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The European Union is making increased efforts to find simpler and more effective ways to function adequately in the eyes of its citizens by using 'soft law' instruments such as recommendations. Although they have no legally binding force, recommendations have practical and legal effects occurring partly due to their normative content in which a course of action is prescribed and further supported by arguments intended to persuade the addressees of a political position. Although recommendations function as persuasive instruments due to their argumentation, the characteristics of argumentation and how it is employed to convince the addressee to comply with certain measures have not been investigated at all. The main goal of the paper is to explain how arguments are used by the European Commission when recommending Member States to follow a new course of action. First, we will unravel the justificatory reasons employed by the Commission in order to make Member States comply with new measures and we will show how these reasons are combined into an argumentative pattern (van Eemeren in Argumentation 30(1): 1-23, 2016; J Argum Context 6(1): 2017). This pattern basically prescribes a course of action to Member States, which is further supported by arguments in which the necessity and advantages of following the proposed course of action are justified. Second, we will explain how and why the way in which the arguments are combined in this complex pattern could be potentially persuasive for the Member States despite the legally non-binding character of recommendations. We will show that the European Commission tries to persuade the Member States to take new measures by evading the burden of proof imposed by the legislative framework. At a more specific level of analysis, we will delve into the implicit premises in the argumentation, which enable us to identify cases of evasion of the burden of proof

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Section: Evading the Burden Of Proof In European Union Soft Law… 85mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Evading the Burden of Proof in European Union Soft Law Instruments: The Case of Commission Recommendations

Andone

Greco

2017

Int J Semiot Law

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“…Governments may also resort to subsidies to aid firms in difficulty and prevent unemployment. Both sorts of anticompetitive behavior breach the competition provisions of the TFEU as well as threaten the enforcement record that DG COMP has painstakingly built over the years (Blauberger 2009;Cini 2001;Smith 1996, 8).…”

Section: The Financial and Economic Crisismentioning

confidence: 99%

The Challenges and Trajectories of EU Competition Policy in the Twenty-first Century

Aydin

Thomas

2012

Journal of European Integration

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Sixty years have now passed since the signing of the Treaty of Paris establishing the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, and during that period competition policy has become firmly anchored as one of the key pillars of European integration. A regime of European competition governance has emerged that centers on the European Commission, specifically its Directorate-General for Competition (DG COMP), and has matured to tackle the four constituent parts of the EU competition policy brief, cartels, monopolies, mergers and state aid. The focus and enforcement of EU competition policy is constantly being reviewed in response to new challenges and opportunities as DG COMP seeks greater consistency in competition norms and greater policy convergence both within the EU and the wider global environment. The opening article of this volume introduces the context in which substantive changes to the EU competition regime has occurred in the twenty-first century. It identifies the major drivers for such change including economic interdependence, the proliferation of national competition laws, and the current financial and economic crisis, and describes how EU competition policy has evolved in response to these challenges.

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“…In an increasingly complex system of "communications," "guidelines" and "frameworks," the Commission has codified its own standards for assessing certain categories of state aid. Formally, these rules are not binding upon the Member States, and for this reason they are constantly referred to as soft rules "which, in principle, have no legally binding force but which nevertheless may have practical effects" (Snyder 1994: 198;Senden 2004: 112;Cini 2001;Aldestam 2004;European Commission 2007a …”

Section: The Treaty Rulesmentioning

confidence: 99%

From Negative to Positive Integration: European State Aid Control Through Soft and Hard Law

Blauberger

2008

SSRN Journal

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Michael Blauberger is a researcher at the Collaborative Research Center 597 "Transformations of the State" at the University of Bremen. He was formerly a doctoral fellow at the MPIfG. blauberger@uni-bremen.deMPIfG Discussion Papers are refereed scholarly papers of the kind that are publishable in a peer-reviewed disciplinary journal. Their objective is to contribute to the cumulative improvement of theoretical knowledge. The papers can be ordered from the institute for a small fee (hard copies) or downloaded free of charge (PDF). AbstractEuropean state aid control, a part of competition policy, typically follows the logic of negative integration. It significantly constrains the potential for Member States to distort competition by reducing their ability to subsidize industry. In addition, this paper argues, ambiguous Treaty rules and heterogeneous Member States' preferences have enabled the European Commission to act as a supranational entrepreneur, not only enforcing the prohibition of distortive state aid, but also developing its own vision of "good" state aid policy. In order to prevent or to settle political conflict about individual decisions, the Commission has sought to establish more general criteria for the state aid which it still deems admissible. These criteria have been codified into a complex system of soft law and, more recently, hard state aid law. The Commission has thus created positive integration "from above" and increasingly influences the objectives of national state aid policies.

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The soft law approach: Commission rule-making in the EU's state aid regime

Cited by 95 publications

References 2 publications

Evading the Burden of Proof in European Union Soft Law Instruments: The Case of Commission Recommendations

Evading the Burden of Proof in European Union Soft Law Instruments: The Case of Commission Recommendations

The Challenges and Trajectories of EU Competition Policy in the Twenty-first Century

From Negative to Positive Integration: European State Aid Control Through Soft and Hard Law

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