The strategic analysis of service mode selection for a ride‐hailing platform

Guo, Dongliang; Fan, Zhi‐Ping; Liu, Yang

doi:10.1111/itor.13271

Cited by 9 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 52 publications

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“…As proposed in the relevant literature, for example, Ebina et al (2022), Sana (2022), and D. Guo et al (2023), we assume that consumers are uniformly distributed on a unit segment

([], 0, 1)

. The mass of each point at time

t

is random, denoted by

y

.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Timing and green decisions for competitive manufacturers under demand uncertainty and risk aversion

Li,

Tan

2024

Manage Decis Econ

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Leveraging real options theory, we have constructed a utility‐based model to examine the influence of uncertainty, risk aversion, and competition on the optimal entry timing for green manufacturers and traditional manufacturers, as well as the degree of greenness for follower products. Our analysis reveals that increased uncertainty and risk aversion enhance the value of investment opportunities for manufacturers, thereby raising their investment thresholds. Even though competition reduces the value of market entry for the leader compared to monopoly, its investment thresholds are unaffected by competition. More interestingly, consumer green preferences exhibit a non‐monotonic impact on green enterprise's entry timing.

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“…As proposed in the relevant literature, for example, Ebina et al (2022), Sana (2022), and D. Guo et al (2023), we assume that consumers are uniformly distributed on a unit segment

([], 0, 1)

. The mass of each point at time

t

is random, denoted by

y

.…”

Section: Modelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Timing and green decisions for competitive manufacturers under demand uncertainty and risk aversion

Li,

Tan

2024

Manage Decis Econ

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show abstract

“…Then, based on pricing, they examine the match of supply and demand. Guo et al (2024) analyze the selection of service modes for a ride-hailing platform. They explore the optimal pricing of services with different levels of service quality and show that the service mode affects the price of low-quality service but not the high-quality service.…”

Section: Platform's Pricing Strategies In a Static Settingmentioning

confidence: 99%

Dynamic competition and market structure for platform‐based products: roles of product quality and indirect network effect

Dou,

Wei,

et al. 2024

Int Trans Operational Res

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We consider dynamic competition between two platform‐based products that exhibit two‐sided network effects, such as game consoles and intelligent hardware. Firms compete in terms of pricing and Research & Development investment, which are driven by consumers’ marginal utility of quality, indirect network effects, and the differentiation between consumers’ preference for the products. We find that with a small marginal utility of consumers, the equilibrium investment of one firm increases first and decreases later with its product quality but is not obviously sensitive to the rival's. In contrast, with a large marginal utility, if the quality of the two products is comparable, the equilibrium investment increases substantially. However, if one product pulls ahead, the other firm will stop investing. Besides, we find that when the intrinsic value and the network value coexist, the market becomes more concentrated, even when consumers’ marginal utility is small. The market concentration increases in both the consumers’ marginal utility and the indirect network effect but decreases in the degree of differentiation between consumers’ preference toward the two products. Interestingly, we show that differentiation plays an important role in shaping the market structure only when the network effect is weak. Counterintuitively, we show that the differentiation corrodes firms’ total profits, which demonstrates that less fierce competition resulting from low substitution leads to a lower profit. Additionally, we reveal that dynamic interaction between quality and installed base motivates firms to improve from a low quality, the first‐mover advantage does not ensure market dominance.

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“…The pricing of green modes of travel has primarily focused on bike sharing [28], vehicle sharing [29], ride sharing [30], and ride hailing [31]. The effort strategy of green travel has included the availability of shared bikes and vehicles [14], fleet management [32], and service-mode selection [33].…”

Section: Pricing and Effort Strategies For Green Travelmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The authors of Zhang and Zhang [42] investigated optimal operations for ride-pooling services regarding the pricing, fleet size, and pooling size, and they observed that the pooling size should be optimized to mitigate congestion. In Guo et al [33], the researchers studied the service mode selection of ride-hailing platforms and found that the platform could set the same prices for low-quality services, as compared to high-quality services.…”

Section: Pricing and Effort Strategies For Green Travelmentioning

confidence: 99%

Competition between Green and Non-Green Travel Companies: The Role of Governmental Subsidies in Green Travel

Huang

2023

Sustainability

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The problem of carbon emissions in transportation is an increasing concern, and consumers need to be encouraged towards green modes of travel to achieve low-carbon travel. To compete with non-green travel companies, green travel companies have considered implementing expensive green efforts to attract consumers. Decisions on travel prices, the green efforts of green travel companies to maintain their competitiveness, and the role of governmental subsidies in promoting green travel must be thoroughly investigated. To consider travel competitiveness and the role of governmental subsidies that support the increased expenses of green travel, this study defined four different decision-making scenarios. The Nash game model without governmental subsidies and the Stackelberg–Nash game model with governmental subsidies were built and solved to understand the effects on the pricing and green efforts of travel companies. The equilibrium results and the role of governmental subsidies were analyzed theoretically and numerically. The results showed that governmental subsidies could boost green efforts while increasing green and non-green travel prices. The competition between green and non-green travel companies both undermined the role of the governmental subsidies and reduced the green and non-green travel prices. A sufficiently large cost-sharing coefficient from the government caused the green travel demand to be higher than the non-green travel demand.

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The strategic analysis of service mode selection for a ride‐hailing platform

Cited by 9 publications

References 52 publications

Timing and green decisions for competitive manufacturers under demand uncertainty and risk aversion

Timing and green decisions for competitive manufacturers under demand uncertainty and risk aversion

Dynamic competition and market structure for platform‐based products: roles of product quality and indirect network effect

Competition between Green and Non-Green Travel Companies: The Role of Governmental Subsidies in Green Travel

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