The Substance and Study of Borders in International Relations Research

Starr, Harvey; Most, Benjamin A.

doi:10.2307/2600341

Cited by 149 publications

(72 citation statements)

References 12 publications

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“…Other examples include the contiguity relations between the United States and the Soviet Union in Alaska, and the United States and Cuba. See also Bremer (1991) for a similar typology, and Starr and Most (1976) for attention to colonial borders. 13.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 96%

Alliance, contiguity, wealth, and political stability: Is the lack of conflict among democracies a statistical artifact?

Maoz

Russett

1992

International Interactions

239

133

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Scholars increasingly are accepting the empirical generalization that democracies almost never go to war with each other, and infrequently even engage in militarized disputes with each other. It has not been clear, however, whether the rarity of conflict between democracies is caused by some aspect of being democratic, or whether it is caused by some other variable or variables that may be correlated with democracy. Using data on all independent states for the period 1946-1986, we examine the effects of political system type, distance, wealth, economic growth, alliances, and political stability. The results suggest that, although most of the other variables do have an effect, as hypothesized, there still seems to be an independent effect of political system type: democracies engage in militarized disputes with each other less than would be expected by chance. The effect may be enhanced by political stability; that is, states which can be perceived as stable democracies are less likely to be involved in disputes with other democracies.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 96%

Alliance, contiguity, wealth, and political stability: Is the lack of conflict among democracies a statistical artifact?

Maoz

Russett

1992

International Interactions

239

133

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“…Geographical contiguity has been found significant in increasing the likelihood of disputes (Hegre, Oneal and Russett 2010;Oneal, Maoz, and Russett 1996;Bremer 1992;Siverson, and Starr 1991;Starr and Most 1976).…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is Liberal Peace Likely in Nuclear Asymmetry?

Lee¹

2015

kjis

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) is a lecturer in the Graduate School of International and Area Studies, Hankuk Univ. of Foreign Studies. He received a Ph.D. in political science from the State Univ. of New York at Buffalo. His research has been empirically exploring the determinants of division and reunification of Korea. Examining quantitatively international relations theories at both Northeast Asian and international levels, he has attempted to build a plausible Korean reunification model. This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean Government (NRF-2012S1A5B5A07036898).This paper mainly aims to address the question of whether liberal peace is likely in situations of nuclear asymmetry. I assume that a non-nuclear state enters into a trade alliance with a nuclear state to obtain security that the nuclear state is capable of offering. I further assume that a nuclear state enters into trade linkages with a non-nuclear state to obtain trade gains. When nuclear and non-nuclear states engage in disputes, the two states lose security or trade gains. Accordingly, while states in nuclear asymmetry are highly conflict-prone, economic ties in nuclear asymmetry could promote peace by promoting the sharing and exchanging of both economic and security gains. Based on these assumptions, I construct primary hypotheses in a situation of nuclear asymmetry and test these during the period of 1950-2001 under analysis by adopting a logit statistical model. The results support that economic relations in situations of nuclear asymmetry have a significant effect in reducing the likelihood of dyadic disputes, but only when the trading linkages are especially valuable and extensively and mutually dependent. To capture negative evidence, I also construct and examine a rival hypothesis that trade linkages in situations of nuclear symmetry are less likely to lead to reduced conflict. Overall, as expected, the results reveal that economic relations in nuclear symmetry have an insignificant effect on conflict.

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“…The literature on interstate conflict has long recognized that conflicts cluster in geographic space (Aleprete and Hoffman 2012;Braithwaite 2006;Enterline 1998;Gleditsch 1995;Lemke 1995;Starr 1980, 1989;O'Laughlin 1987;Siverson and Starr 1990;Starr 2002;Starr and Most 1976;Starr and Thomas 2005;Vasquez 1995). However, our theoretical focus and empirical analysis focuses on the ability of states to project power past shared borders and regional neighborhoods.…”

Section: Previous Researchmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As states project farther from their home, the number of state interactions will increase. 5 An increase in the number of interactions between states means that opportunities for conflict will be greater (Most and Starr 1980;Most and Starr 1989;Siverson and Starr 1990;Starr and Most 1976). In other words, states are more likely to fight states that they interact with more frequently (Gartzke 2009;Gartzke and Rohner 2011;Hegre 2008).…”

Section: The Relationship Between Power Projection and Warmentioning

confidence: 99%