The theory of emotion.

Abstract

In a preceding article 1 I endeavored to show that all the so-called expressions of emotion are to be accounted for not by reference to emotion, but by reference to movements having some use, either as direct survivals or as disturbances of teleological coordinations. I tried to show that, upon this basis, the various principles for explaining emotional attitudes may be reduced to certain obvious and typical differentia within the teleological movements. In the present paper I wish to reconsider the James-Lange, or discharge, theory of the nature of emotion from the standpoint thus gained; for if all emotions (considered as ' emotional seizures,' Affect* or ' feel,' as I may term it) are constituted by the reflexion of the teleological attitude, the motor and organic discharges, into consciousness, the same principle which explains the attitude must serve to analyze the emotion. The fact, if it be a fact, that all ' emotional expression' is a phase of movements teleologically determined, and not a result of pre-existent emotion, is itself a strong argument for the discharge theory. I had occasion to point out in my previous article that the facts brought under the head of ' antithesis ' and < analogous stimuli' are absolutely unaccountable upon the central theory, and are matters of course upon the James theory. But this statement may be further generalized. If every emotional attitude is referred to useful acts, and if the emotion is not the reflex of such act, where does

Toward better research on stress and coping.

“…Here psychologists might follow the lead of John Dewey (1894Dewey ( , 1896Dewey & Bentley, 1949), the philosopher-psychologist, who argued for the importance of synthesis. When psychologists study stress, emotion, and coping, they want to accurately portray the behavioral display and the experience of emotions and to say what they are like.…”

Dewey's Rejection of the Emotion/Expression Distinction

“…Rather, there is simply the emotion as lived through-part of which includes an "expressive" component: the emotional experience as articulated through a particular piece of overt behavior or pattern of "serviceable associated habits. 24 But Dewey argues further that "[t]o rate such movements as primarily expressive is to fall into the psychologist's fallacy: it is to confuse the standpoint of the observer and explainer with that of the fact observed". 25 From the first-person perspective we simply live through our emotions.…”

“…These responses-and the actions they feed into-form the basis of both our judgments (running away, we get the idea of "bear-as-thing-to-be-run-away-from") as well as our emotional phenomenology. 12 As Dewey glosses James, our "beating heart, trembling and running legs, sinking in stomach, looseness of bowels, etc." are part of "a certain act of seeing, which by habit, whether inherited or acquired, sets up other acts" such as turning and running away or judging that the bear is fearful.…”

“…First, it generates an artificially simplified, serial account of a phenomenon that, in its lived fullness, rather exhibits an integrated, dynamic, and multidimensional reality. 7 I say more about this below.…”

“…This is their adaptive utility. 2 Dewey argues further that this agentive characterization of emotions, as we might term it, helps clarify their intentional character. Emotions involve an orientation or attitude toward some object or state of affairs: "[T]he full emotional experience…is always "about" or "toward" something; it is "at" or "on account of" something, and this prepositional reference is an integral phase of the single pulse of emotion".…”