Building on blame avoidance analysis, this article develops a method to assess the reactivity, sequencing and efficacy of defensive responses by officeholders facing a crisis of personal blame, analysing cases drawn from four advanced democracies. It tests the hypotheses that officeholders: react by positive action rather than non-engagement when blame levels are high; respond in a 'staged retreat' sequence; and can reduce the level of blame they face from one day to another through choice of presentational strategies. The article applies event history analysis to test the sequencing hypothesis and time series cross-sectional models to test the reactivity and efficacy hypotheses. The analysis shows that officeholders tend to respond actively when blame levels are high, that to some extent their responses tend to follow a staged retreat pattern, and their interventions have a systematic effect on the next day's media blame level only if they take the form of personal statements.
BLAME AVOIDANCE IN POLITICAL CRISES AND SCANDALS: IS THERE ORDER BENEATH THE APPARENT CHAOS?This article aims to contribute to a new generation of research on blame avoidance. It challenges the commonly held view (as put forward by Barker 1994, for example) that the course of events in political crises and scandals is typically unpredictable, chaotic and unmanageable, with events running out of control and no underlying regularities. That view is reflected in a range of sometimes contradictory proverbs about political scandals. For example, it is claimed that active media management is the key to success (as in the oft-quoted maxim of former Nixon aide Roger Stone, 'Admit nothing, deny everything, launch counterattack' (Labash 2007)) or alternatively that initial non-response is the best strategy given short media attention-spans (Hood 2011, pp. 58-59). Others suggest that 'the cover-up is worse than the crime', or that efforts at spin are ultimately self-defeating (Kurtz 1998).The analysis of blame avoidance in politics is beginning to allow us to bring more systematic evidence to bear on such claims. Although ideas about the handling of blame in politics stretch back to Machiavelli and beyond, the modern analysis of blame avoidance is barely 30 years old, starting with Kent Weaver's (1986) seminal contribution. It brought together observations about negativity bias (Lau 1985) and political behaviour (Fiorina 1981) to develop a perspective that cut across several political science subfields such as voting and political behaviour, public administration and public policy (see also Hood 2002Hood , 2011). Weaver's basic claim was that politicians tend to give greater weight to potential blame (for losses) than credit (for gains), consistent with insights from prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).There have since been some theoretical explorations of blame avoidance, but most empirical studies have been qualitative, particularly in the welfare state literature (e.g. Pierson 1994;Lindbom 2007 Dixon et al. 2013; Olsen 2015, pp. 469-79); ...