Blame Avoidance in Comparative Perspective: Reactivity, Staged Retreat and Efficacy

Abstract

Building on blame avoidance analysis, this article develops a method to assess the reactivity, sequencing and efficacy of defensive responses by officeholders facing a crisis of personal blame, analysing cases drawn from four advanced democracies. It tests the hypotheses that officeholders: react by positive action rather than non-engagement when blame levels are high; respond in a 'staged retreat' sequence; and can reduce the level of blame they face from one day to another through choice of presentational strategies. The article applies event history analysis to test the sequencing hypothesis and time series cross-sectional models to test the reactivity and efficacy hypotheses. The analysis shows that officeholders tend to respond actively when blame levels are high, that to some extent their responses tend to follow a staged retreat pattern, and their interventions have a systematic effect on the next day's media blame level only if they take the form of personal statements. BLAME AVOIDANCE IN POLITICAL CRISES AND SCANDALS: IS THERE ORDER BENEATH THE APPARENT CHAOS?This article aims to contribute to a new generation of research on blame avoidance. It challenges the commonly held view (as put forward by Barker 1994, for example) that the course of events in political crises and scandals is typically unpredictable, chaotic and unmanageable, with events running out of control and no underlying regularities. That view is reflected in a range of sometimes contradictory proverbs about political scandals. For example, it is claimed that active media management is the key to success (as in the oft-quoted maxim of former Nixon aide Roger Stone, 'Admit nothing, deny everything, launch counterattack' (Labash 2007)) or alternatively that initial non-response is the best strategy given short media attention-spans (Hood 2011, pp. 58-59). Others suggest that 'the cover-up is worse than the crime', or that efforts at spin are ultimately self-defeating (Kurtz 1998).The analysis of blame avoidance in politics is beginning to allow us to bring more systematic evidence to bear on such claims. Although ideas about the handling of blame in politics stretch back to Machiavelli and beyond, the modern analysis of blame avoidance is barely 30 years old, starting with Kent Weaver's (1986) seminal contribution. It brought together observations about negativity bias (Lau 1985) and political behaviour (Fiorina 1981) to develop a perspective that cut across several political science subfields such as voting and political behaviour, public administration and public policy (see also Hood 2002Hood , 2011). Weaver's basic claim was that politicians tend to give greater weight to potential blame (for losses) than credit (for gains), consistent with insights from prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979).There have since been some theoretical explorations of blame avoidance, but most empirical studies have been qualitative, particularly in the welfare state literature (e.g. Pierson 1994;Lindbom 2007 Dixon et al. 2013; Olsen 2015, pp. 469-79); ...

Accountability and Blame Avoidance After Crises

“…Informal, or non-governmental, forums would typically include both traditional and social media but also non-government organizations (NGOs), citizen journalism collectives (think of the Bellingcat collective, Global Voices, or the Independent Media Center), and publication outlets of independent authors, journalists, and academic scholars. Many studies on blaming strategies in the more formal political arena show how media influence interactions between political opponents (Brändström, Kuipers, & Daléus, 2008;Hinterleitner & Sager, 2015;Hood et al, 2009;Hood, Jennings, & Copeland, 2016;Resodihardjo, Carroll, Van Eijk, & Maris, 2016;Stark, 2011). A rare study on blame avoidance in a nondemocratic regime (China) shows how authorities there face a pronounced trade-off between media transparency and secrecy in crisis management, with strong implications for formal accountability (Baekkeskov & Rubin, 2016. Media not only play a direct role as a forum that holds "the powers that be" accountable, but they also provide an informal venue for framing and blaming by formal actors.…”

Errors have been made, others will be blamed: Issue engagement and blame shifting in prime minister speeches during the economic crisis in Europe

“…Changing institutional procedures takes time, and policy choices are severely constrained, since all governments are forced to implement budget cuts one way or another. 8 In these "negative-sum" policy situations (Weaver 1986), a third type of blame avoidance strategiespresentational strategies -become important (Hood 2002;Hood 2010, Hood et al 2016Hinterleitner and Sager 2017;Hansson 2018). 9 Such a presentational strategy might entail blame shifting to other countries or supranational institutions.…”

Information Dilemmas and Blame‐Avoidance Strategies: From Secrecy to Lightning Rods in Chinese Health Crises

“…Considerable literatures in political science (Ellis 1994;Hood 2007Hood , 2011Pierson 1996;Weaver 1996) and crisis management studies (Boin, McConnell, and 't Hart, 2008;Boin et al 2005;Br€ andstr€ om and Kuipers 2003;Moynihan 2012;Olson 2000;Svensson et al 2006) show that political leaders often take decisions that reduce risks of public blame. Blame-avoidance scholars tend to study democratic contexts (Br€ andstr€ om and Kuipers 2003;Elgie 2006;Ellis 1994;Giger and Nelson 2011;Hood, Jennings, and Paul Copeland 2015;Mortensen 2012;Svensson et al 2006;Weaver 1986). Elected leaders need direct popular support.…”

“…Linking the Chinese regime's changing epidemic information management to shifting blame avoidance strategy moves literature on blame avoidance away from its current near‐exclusive focus on democracies (Brändström and Kuipers ; Elgie ; Ellis ; Giger and Nelson ; Hood, Jennings, and Copeland ; Mortensen ; Svensson, Mabuchi, and Kamikawa ; Weaver ). The literature on how politicians and bureaucrats in democracies avoid blame and shape or sustain positive popular images can also be applied to China's quintessential authoritarian regime (and other authoritarian polities), particularly if secrecy fails to prevent public blame.…”