The transatlantic dialogue on Iran: the European subaltern and hegemonic constraints in the implementation of the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran

Pieper, Moritz

doi:10.1080/09662839.2016.1240676

Cited by 20 publications

(3 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…In this light, while Iran represents a partner for Russia to challenge US order conceptions for the region, it is also true that Iran's return to global energy markets increases the competition for the same (European) markets. Nevertheless, besides Russia's structural leverage via control over energy distribution networks, Moscow knows that European companies tend to 'over-comply' with US financial sanctions that remain in place (Pieper, 2016). Iran's rise as an energy competitor is, therefore, far from realistic.…”

Section: Transnationalising Energy Interestsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Russian Intervention in Syria: Exploring the Nexus between Regime Consolidation and Energy Transnationalisation

Maher

Pieper

2020

Political Studies

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Interpretations of Russia’s military intervention in Syria overwhelmingly focus on Russia’s political motivations. An alternative view foregrounds Russia’s economic motivations, namely, the construction of a multi-billion-dollar gas pipeline traversing Iran, Iraq and Syria. This article examines the salience of Russia’s economic motivations and considers two related aspects: First, if Russian intervention aims to secure areas of strategic importance for the proposed pipeline. Second, if Russian intervention realises longer term political and commercial interests that include proposed future pipeline projects. The evidence suggests Russian military policies towards Syria are unlikely to be motivated primarily by the prospect of a proposed gas pipeline, but that regime consolidation is a more immediate policy goal. This article then posits that Russian intervention has a distinct ‘dual logic’ aimed at integrating the interests of key regional actors into a transnational energy network, while stabilising Russia’s regional dominance within this network.

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Section: Transnationalising Energy Interestsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Russian Intervention in Syria: Exploring the Nexus between Regime Consolidation and Energy Transnationalisation

Maher

Pieper

2020

Political Studies

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“…Only after the US unilaterally had come forward in 2010 with much more severe economic sanctions, and after it had threatened European firms active in the US and doing business in Iran, did the EU‐3 agree on much more advanced economic sanctions, including a far‐reaching oil embargo in 2012, which was unprecedented for the EU (Pieper, ). Iran was also excluded from the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT), a key financial institution in the world.…”

Section: Addressing the Crisis: The Role Of The E3 Eu‐3 And Eu‐3mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Role of Informal International Organizations in Resolving the Iranian Nuclear Crisis (2003–15)

Sauer

2019

J of Common Market Studies

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This article attempts to discover why states have chosen to co-ordinate within ad hoc informal international organizations instead or on top of formal ones, in order to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis in the period 2003-15. Three informal groups of statesthe E3 (France, Germany and the UK), the EU-3 (the E3 + the EU High Representative), and the EU-3 + 3 (the EU-3 + the US, Russia, and China)are widely seen as having contributed to the diplomatic solution. Empirically, one can wonder why formal international organizations like the UN, the IAEA and the EU were not able to do the wheeling and dealing by themselves in the case of the Iranian nuclear conflict. From a theoretical perspective, this article highlights the role of informal international organizations, a subject that is under-researched both in EU and International Relations studies. It will argue that these temporary informal international organizations have three advantages: no (or less) bureaucracy, speed, and the ability to buy time for more important diplomatic actors like major states or formal international organizations.

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“…The situation was quite similar to the one in 1996, but this time the Europeans did not protest; on the contrary, the outcomes of the US campaign paved the way for the imposition of unilateral sanctions on Iran by the EU, coordinating them with the American coercive measures (Pieper 2017: 103). Because of that, some scholars claim that the US, as the hegemon, practically forced the EU to adopt the tough strategy (Lohmann 2016;Pieper 2017). However, the EU's motives should not be confused with its actions.…”

Section: Creation Of Co-leadershipmentioning

confidence: 99%

Why does cooperation work or fail? The case of EU-US sanction policy against Iran

Matera

2019

Croatian International Relations Review

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In the article, we explore the factors which brought about the transatlantic coordination of the policy of imposing sanctions on Iran. We will mainly focus on the events in the 21st century when the new incentives for cooperation appeared due to the growing concern over the development of Iran’s nuclear programme. Considering the capabilities of using the tools of economic statecraft and diplomacy, we claim that the EU-US cooperation can be termed a co-leadership. The assessment and the reasons for the transatlantic break-up on this matter during the presidency of Donald Trump was examined using the concept of relative gains. We evaluate to what extent the initial goals were achieved in practice, and we also try to predict the possible consequences of the US withdrawal from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). As to whether the effectiveness of the sanctions through the cooperation has been enhanced, the answer is ambivalent. On the one hand, the cooperating transatlantic partners managed to coerce Iran through isolating the country from international economic contacts and negotiated the JCPOA. On the other hand, Trump’s renouncement of this agreement brought many negative consequences and undermined the earlier joint effort.

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The transatlantic dialogue on Iran: the European subaltern and hegemonic constraints in the implementation of the 2015 nuclear agreement with Iran

Cited by 20 publications

References 34 publications

Russian Intervention in Syria: Exploring the Nexus between Regime Consolidation and Energy Transnationalisation

Russian Intervention in Syria: Exploring the Nexus between Regime Consolidation and Energy Transnationalisation

The Role of Informal International Organizations in Resolving the Iranian Nuclear Crisis (2003–15)

Why does cooperation work or fail? The case of EU-US sanction policy against Iran

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