The Trouble with Statistical Evidence

Schmalbeck, Richard L.

doi:10.2307/1191634

Cited by 6 publications

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“…Third, some argue that rational belief is context‐ or question‐sensitive (e.g., maybe the threshold for rational belief varies with stakes)—endorsing contextualism is one way to maintain both closure and consistency (Kyburg, 1988; Leitgeb, 2013b, 2014a, 2015, 2017; van Fraassen, 1995; Yalcin, 2018). Naked statistical evidence cases warrant a separate response—Lockeans argue that we can rationally form beliefs based on mere statistical evidence (Ahlstrom‐Vij & Dunn, 2014, p. 547; Schmalback, 1986) or that mere statistical evidence is not a basis for rational high credence (Freitag & Zinke, Forthcoming). Another way Lockeans can respond to both the lottery and the statistical evidence cases is by raising the belief‐threshold to certainty (Greco, 2015, p. 183).…”

Section: Belief and Credence: Normative Questionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The relationship between belief and credence

Jackson

2020

Philosophy Compass

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Sometimes epistemologists theorize about belief, a tripartite attitude on which one can believe, withhold belief, or disbelieve a proposition. In other cases, epistemologists theorize about credence, a fine‐grained attitude that represents one's subjective probability or confidence level toward a proposition. How do these two attitudes relate to each other? This article explores the relationship between belief and credence in two categories: descriptive and normative. It then explains the broader significance of the belief‐credence connection and concludes with general lessons from the debate thus far. Video Abstract link: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=3eOSlPVYxI8&feature=youtu.be

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Section: Belief and Credence: Normative Questionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

The relationship between belief and credence

Jackson

2020

Philosophy Compass

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“…2 See, for example, Kaye (1979); Schmalbeck (1986); Schoeman (1987); Allen & Leiter (2001); Schauer (2003); Redmayne (2015); Hedden & Colyvan (2019); Krauss (2020); Ross (2021); Papineau (2021). 3 For a representative set of cases, see Malcom (2008); Roth (2010).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

When statistical evidence is not specific enough

Bello

2021

Synthese

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Many philosophers have pointed out that statistical evidence, or at least some forms of it, lack desirable epistemic or non-epistemic properties, and that this should make us wary of litigations in which the case against the defendant rests in whole or in part on statistical evidence. Others have responded that such broad reservations about statistical evidence are overly restrictive since appellate courts have expressed nuanced views about statistical evidence. In an effort to clarify and reconcile, I put forward an interpretive analysis of why statistical evidence should raise concerns in some cases but not others. I argue that when there is a mismatch between the specificity of the evidence and the expected specificity of the accusation, statistical evidence-as any other kind of evidence-should be considered insufficient to sustain a conviction. I rely on different stylized court cases to illustrate the explanatory power of this analysis.

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“…This and similar puzzles about statistical evidence in legal proof have been around for a while (Cohen, 1977;Kaye, 1979;Nesson, 1979;Thomson, 1986). Some scholars have expressed reservations about these puzzles, noting that they are far removed from trial practice (Schmalbeck, 1986;Allen and Leiter, 2001). Despite these reservations, however, philosophers and legal scholars have shown a renewed interest in naked statistical evidence and the puzzles that it raises in both criminal and civil cases (see, e.g., Wasserman, 1991;Stein, 2005;Redmayne, 2008;Ho, 2008;Roth, 2010;Enoch et al, 2012;Cheng, 2013;Pritchard, 2015;Blome-Tillmann, 2015;Nunn, 2015;Pundik, 2017;Moss, 2018;Pardo, 2018;Smith, 2018;Bolinger, forthcoming;Di Bello, forthcoming).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Proof Paradoxes and Normic Support: Socializing or Relativizing?

Bello

2019

Mind

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Smith (2018) argues that, unlike other forms of evidence, naked statistical evidence fails to satisfy normic support. This is his solution to the puzzles of statistical evidence in legal proof. This paper focuses on Smith’s claim that DNA evidence in cold-hit cases does not satisfy normic support. I argue that if this claim is correct, virtually no other form of evidence used at trial can satisfy normic support. This is troublesome. I discuss a few ways in which Smith can respond.

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The Trouble with Statistical Evidence

Cited by 6 publications

References 0 publications

The relationship between belief and credence

The relationship between belief and credence

When statistical evidence is not specific enough

Proof Paradoxes and Normic Support: Socializing or Relativizing?

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