The value of political connections: evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign

Alonso, Marta; Palma, Nuno; Simon-Yarza, Beatriz

doi:10.1017/s1744137422000017

Cited by 8 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 68 publications

(113 reference statements)

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“…It has reduced the positive correlation between the political capital and the value of listed non-state firms (Liu and Ying, 2019). Only private firms with close political connections to the Politburo have continued to reap economic benefits through subsidies or cheaper loans (Alonso et al, 2022). Given the negligible number of firms that can cultivate connections at this reified level, more readily available venues to raise political capital have become attractive.…”

Section: Political Capital and Resource Dependencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Private Investment in Chinese Football Clubs: Political Capital and State–Business Exchanges

Ross,

Sullivan,

Lai

2023

Journal of Current Chinese Affairs

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Business–government relations play a crucial role in China's economic development and policy implementation. Situated in an asymmetric dependency nexus, local officials court business investments to facilitate policy and boost their political careers, while under Xi Jinping private firms are increasingly incentivised to support party-state goals to gain access to political capital. In this study, we use the case of football development to show how private business actors and government officials enter reciprocal relationships based on the exchange of respective financial and political capital. Using insights from semistructured interviews with practitioners and macro-level data, such as investors’ characteristics and financial data, we explore the role of political capital in state–business exchanges, specifying the mechanisms of this interaction (motivations, forms, and perceived benefits) and three distinct investment scenarios in the case of football. Besides insights into the sector, the article contributes to the understanding of the modus operandi of private business and local government in the Chinese political economy at large.

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Section: Political Capital and Resource Dependencymentioning

confidence: 99%

Private Investment in Chinese Football Clubs: Political Capital and State–Business Exchanges

Ross,

Sullivan,

Lai

2023

Journal of Current Chinese Affairs

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“…To continue with the convention, in 2003, the United Nations General Assembly adopted the 'UN Convention Against Corruption', which is a landmark of the international anticorruption treaty. Individual countries and regions also recognize the importance of anticorruption programs and legislation, such as the UK Bribery Act of 2010, and China's Anticorruption and Build a Clean Government program (Alonso et al, 2022;Fayissa and Nsiah, 2013;Runde and Metzger, 2020). However, these anticorruption actions have not effectively alleviated the coexistence of global corruption and development.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The effect of corruption control on efficiency spillovers

Kutlu

Mao

2023

Journal of Institutional Economics

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We examine the effect of corruption control on efficiency and its implications for efficiency spillovers by a stochastic frontier model. Our dataset covers 102 countries from 1996 to 2014. We find a positive relationship between corruption control and efficiency. If neighboring countries have difficulty in handling corruption, the country would be negatively affected by its neighbors' corruption through efficiency spillovers. We then compare the efficiency differences across countries for three time periods: 1996–2002, 2002–2008, and 2008–2014. On average, technical efficiencies slightly increased in the second period compared to the first period. In the third period, the efficiencies declined, particularly in China.

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The impact of institutions, industry, and scale of operations on foreign subsidiaries’ political connections: evidence from Saudi Arabia and Egypt

Baokbah,

Shirodkar

2024

CPOIB

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Purpose Research on the political connections of multinational enterprises’ (MNEs’) subsidiaries in emerging host countries has been growing. The purpose of this paper is to integrate institutional and resource dependence theories to argue that MNEs-subsidiaries are likely to develop fewer formal (i.e. board-level) political connections when operating in welfare-state monarchies as compared to in host countries with developmental-state democratic systems. Furthermore, this paper argues that MNE-subsidiaries develop formal political connections to a greater extent in industries where religion influences the development of products and services considerably. Finally, the extent of developing formal political connections varies by the scale of the MNEs’ investment (or subsidiary density) in the host market. Design/methodology/approach The paper tests its hypotheses on a sample of foreign-owned subsidiaries operating in Saudi Arabia and Egypt. The data was collected by combining information from Bureau Van Dijk’s Orbis database with company websites and other secondary sources. The final sample consisted of 156 observations – 70 MNEs-subsidiaries operating in Saudi Arabia, and 86 in Egypt. Findings The findings confirm that foreign subsidiaries are likely to develop fewer formal political connections in a welfare-state monarchy as compared to in a developmental-state democratic system. Furthermore, formal political connections are more significant in industries that are impacted by the influence of religion – such as the financial industry in Arab countries. Finally, the extent of using political connections varies by the scale of the MNEs’ investment in the host market – that is, with a greater scale of investment (or higher subsidiary density), formal political connections are greater. Originality/value The paper contributes theoretically by explaining that a combination of institutional heterogeneity and its associated resource dependence conditions between MNEs and host governments influence MNE-subsidiaries' political connections. The paper tests its hypotheses in an emerging Arab context, which is characterized by both autocratic and semi-democratic political settings, and which makes the integration of institutional and resource dependence theories useful in explaining how MNE-subsidiaries navigate local complexities in this region.

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The value of political connections: evidence from China's anti-corruption campaign

Cited by 8 publications

References 68 publications

Private Investment in Chinese Football Clubs: Political Capital and State–Business Exchanges

Private Investment in Chinese Football Clubs: Political Capital and State–Business Exchanges

The effect of corruption control on efficiency spillovers

The impact of institutions, industry, and scale of operations on foreign subsidiaries’ political connections: evidence from Saudi Arabia and Egypt

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