The Value of Rational Nature

Regan, Donald H.

doi:10.1086/324235

Cited by 79 publications

(19 citation statements)

References 6 publications

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“…One of the main worries constructivist accounts of practical reasons encounter is that they seem to leave us with an unpleasant subjectivism about practical reasons (Regan, 2002). Critics of the constructivist paradigm claim that there is an arbitrariness about our reasons for action that comes with the strategy of fully internalizing their sources.…”

Section: The Placebo Analogymentioning

confidence: 99%

Two Conceptions of Practical Reasons

Hänisch

2016

Les ateliers de l'éthique

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Section: The Placebo Analogymentioning

confidence: 99%

Two Conceptions of Practical Reasons

Hänisch

2016

Les ateliers de l'éthique

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“…Furthermore, it is hard to see that the ability to “plump” for one worthless option rather than another is valuable at all, let alone that it is of supreme value. These difficulties are forcefully pressed by Regan (2002) who concludes that “rational nature cannot be valuable in a Kantian world” 6…”

Section: Problems For Kantian Constructivismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Regan (2002: 267). See also FitzPatrick (2005) for a very thorough critique of Kantian constructivism.…”

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confidence: 99%

Kantian Value Realism

Hills

2008

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Why should we be interested in Kant's ethical theory? One reason is that we find his views about our moral responsibilities appealing.Anyone who thinks that we should treat other people with respect, that we should not use them as a mere means in ways to which they could not possibly consent, will be attracted by a Kantian style of ethical theory.But according to recent supporters of Kant, the most distinctive and important feature of his ethical theory is not his claims about the particular ethical duties that we owe to each other, but his views about the nature of value. They argue that Kant has an account of the relationship between practical reason and value, known as "Kantian constructivism" that is far superior to the traditional "value realist" theory, and that it is because of this that we should accept his theory. 1 It is now standard for both supporters and critics to claim that Kant's moral theory stands or falls with Kantian constructivism. 2 But this is a mistake. In this paper, I sketch a rival Kantian theory of value, which I call Kantian value realism. I argue that there is textual evidence that Kant himself accepted value realism rather than constructivism. Whilst my aim in this paper is to set out the theory clearly rather than to defend it, I will try to show that Kantian value realism is preferable to Kantian constructivism and that it is worthy of further study.1

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“…Note, however, that this self-understanding and the noumenal/ phenomenal distinction operative in it is produced by practical -not theoretical -reason.14 Henry Allison notes the importance of self-deception for a Kantian account of evil in his article 'Reflections on the Banality of (Radical) Evil: A Kantian Analysis'(Allison 1996: 169-82).15 These structures are discussed throughout Korsgaard's work, including 'Kant's Formula of Humanity'(Korsgaard 1996a: 106-33, and1996b). DonaldRegan (2002) challenges the idea present in her work that value is dependent on such rational endorsement. DavidSussman (2003) shows that this criticism is justified only if the claim is that practical reason's willing creates goods, rather than the more kant on radical evil and the origin of moral responsibilityVOLUME 18 -1 KANTIAN REVIEW | 69 http://journals.cambridge.org Downloaded: 14 Mar 2015…”

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confidence: 99%

Kant on Radical Evil and the Origin of Moral Responsibility

McMullin

2013

Kantian rev.

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The notion of radical evil plays a more important role in Kant's moral theory than is typically recognized. In Religion Within the Limits of Mere Reason, radical evil is both an innate propensity and a morally imputable act -a paradoxical status that has prompted commentators to reject it as inconsistent with the rest of Kant's moral theory. In contrast, I argue that the notion of radical evil accounts for the beginning of moral responsibility in Kant's theory, since the act of attributing radical evil to one's freedom is an inauguration into the autonomous stance.

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The Value of Rational Nature

Cited by 79 publications

References 6 publications

Two Conceptions of Practical Reasons

Two Conceptions of Practical Reasons

Kantian Value Realism

Kant on Radical Evil and the Origin of Moral Responsibility

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