The year that never was: 1973 and the crisis between the United States and the European Community

Abstract

In order to revitalise the neglected transatlantic ties, the Nixon administration unilaterally deliberated that 1973 was to be the 'Year of Europe'. However, 1973 did not end with the solemn renewal of the Atlantic Declaration that Kissinger had sought. On the contrary, this initiative prompted the countries of the recently enlarged EEC to engage in the first attempt to take a unitary foreign policy stance and highlighted the Nixon administration's contradictions regarding the European integration project. These contradictions, in addition to the numerous tensions that already strained transatlantic relations, gave birth to a downward spiral of incomprehension and misperceptions, seriously worsened by the unexpected deflagration of the October War. However, even though the tensions did not disappear, the European common front soon started to disintegrate, mainly under the strains imposed by the oil crisis.Transatlantic relations underwent a deep change during the 1960s. Post-World War II cooperation, based on European dependence and American leadership, slowly gave way to growing misunderstandings, economic competition and diverging views about military and foreign policy. The weakening of the US economy, and détente, led the Nixon administration to adopt policies interpreted by the Europeans as direct challenges to their economic and security interests. With most of the administration's energy absorbed by the Vietnam War during its first mandate, Europe was not destined to play a central role in the wider US strategy, since the Grand Design to build a new peace structure and lessen the burdens on the slowed-down US economy centred around relations with the USSR and China. Thus, the European allies were increasingly ignored during the 1960s. There were few exchanges within NATO, and European countries were not consulted even on crucial occasions such as the 1971 economic measures. Contacts with Europe grew increasingly sparse, secret and bilateral under the growing influence of Kissinger, who rapidly tightened his grip on American foreign policy. 1

Tweaking or Breaking of the International Order: Kissinger, Shultz, and Transatlantic Relations, 1971-1973

“…1 The monetary paralysis intersected with political discord. Kissinger's Year of Europe initiative is considered as a major policy failure (Jones 2013;Möckli 2010;Noble 2010;Pietrantonio 2010;Robb 2010). Kissinger assessed the 1973 initiative in his memoir: "the year that never was" (Kissinger 1982: 192).…”

“…Indeed, Kissinger missed changes in European leaders' attitudes toward the Year of Europe. Studies on the Year of Europe have documented that Europeans, initially sympathetic to the project, turned increasingly negative due to their misgivings about U.S. intentions (Hilfrich 2010;Jones 2013;Möckli 2010;Nichter 2015;Noble 2010;Pietrantonio 2010;Robb 2010;Schwartz 2019). However, these studies fail to explain such changes in attitude.…”