Theorie richterlichen Begründens.

Christensen, Ralph; Kudlich, Hans

doi:10.3790/978-3-428-50544-9

Cited by 15 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…Something went awry with this line of reasoning. (Luhmann, 2004: 76) A fundamental problem is thus to be identified, both within the antagonism that exists between theories of legal sources and decisionism, as well as in efforts to reconcile the two (Christensen and Kudich, 2001: 118ff.). 3 Conventional legal sources wisdom conceives of the judge as a handmaiden to the law.…”

Section: Judgement Between Cognition and Decisionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Auctoritatis Interpositio: How Systems Theory Deconstructs Decisionism

Fischer-Lescano

Christensen

2012

Social & Legal Studies

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A deconstructivist interpretation of Luhmann's systems theory can provide a new basis for the understanding of legal decision-making. While legal scholars traditionally describe the process of judgement either as a stylized conclusion whose content educes from legal sources (judicial deduction) or -in the tradition of Carl Schmittas an act of will, whose normative content entails a creatio ex nihilo (judicial will), contemporary legal thought supports, for the most part, some form of compromise between the two theories. In a systems theoretical perspective, however, the opposing notions of will and deduction have to be traced back to a fundamental paradox of law, the paradox of legal decision-making. We argue that this paradox-oriented approach is not just another variation of decisionism of a Schmittian nature. Rather it goes well beyond decisionism in that it takes account of the societal context of the decisionmaking process and insists on the importance of the legal form and the autonomy of law as a social system. A deconstructivist interpretation further sets the stage for a new conception of the political dimension within law, by pointing out that legal decision-making in the light of undecidability is itself a political act. This conceptionalization calls for an identification of real-world social conflicts and their reformulation within the quaestio iuris.

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Section: Judgement Between Cognition and Decisionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Auctoritatis Interpositio: How Systems Theory Deconstructs Decisionism

Fischer-Lescano

Christensen

2012

Social & Legal Studies

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“…Sie sollen eine Meinung nur begründen. Mit Sätzen begründet zu entscheiden, ist die eigentliche Leistung des eingerichteten Rechtsbetriebs (Christensen/Kudlich 2001). Die Anforderungen für sachverhaltsbestimmende Schriftsätze richten sich auf eine narrative Grundlagenkompetenz: Man muss personalisiert, detailliert und sequentiell vortragen (Sauer 2002, S. 110), auf deutsch: zielgerichtet erzählen.…”

Section: Sprachnormativität Als Sachlichkeitunclassified

Rechtsnormen als Sprachnormen

Konopka¹,

Strecker²

2009

Deutsche Grammatik - Regeln, Normen, Sprachgebrauch

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Rechtsnormen beruhen auf grammatischen und textverknüpfenden Sprachnormen, die Sachverhalte entscheidbar machen. Diese Normsprachkompetenz ist Teil der juristischen Ausbildung, des impliziten Praxiswissens in der Justiz und der expliziten Begründungsrügen gegen Urteile. Der Beitrag beginnt mit einem Seitenblick auf den vorbildlich gegen Sprachnormen verstoßenden Richter Azdak aus dem Kaukasischen Kreidekreis, geht über zu einem Kasusmusterexemplar von Andre Jolles und veranschaulicht die Normsprachbestandteile an Beispielen aus höchstrichterlichen Entscheidungstexten.

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“…This understanding is reflected among others in the prominent part played by the analysis of legal decisions in legal argumentation (see for example Sobota, 1996;Christensen and Kudlich, 2001). But not only the judge is engaged in argumentation in this case, the defendant is, too.…”

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confidence: 91%

In the Field – The Development of Reasons in Criminal Proceedings

Hannken-Illjes

2006

Argumentation

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This paper is concerned with argumentation in legal proceedings, namely in criminal cases. My interest is to explore how in the legal realm different argumentation fields interact, the juridical field being just one of them. The paper lays out an approach of studying argumentation in the legal realm in the framework of an ethnographic methodology by identifying the ''topical rules'' the participants in criminal trials adhere to. Suggesting the notion of field-dependence as a good starting point for the analysis of legal argumentation, I will give several examples of different fields of argumentation interacting in criminal proceedings. The examination of what counts as a good reason and how arguments are employed, negotiated, and evaluated within a criminal proceeding might shed light on the practice of constructing facts and arriving at decisions in court. It can furthermore point at the constitution of legal rationality and how it is produced in criminal trials. I argue that rationality in criminal proceedings is interactively accomplished by negotiating different standards of validity.

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Theorie richterlichen Begründens.

Cited by 15 publications

References 0 publications

Auctoritatis Interpositio: How Systems Theory Deconstructs Decisionism

Auctoritatis Interpositio: How Systems Theory Deconstructs Decisionism

Rechtsnormen als Sprachnormen

In the Field – The Development of Reasons in Criminal Proceedings

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