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A deconstructivist interpretation of Luhmann's systems theory can provide a new basis for the understanding of legal decision-making. While legal scholars traditionally describe the process of judgement either as a stylized conclusion whose content educes from legal sources (judicial deduction) or -in the tradition of Carl Schmittas an act of will, whose normative content entails a creatio ex nihilo (judicial will), contemporary legal thought supports, for the most part, some form of compromise between the two theories. In a systems theoretical perspective, however, the opposing notions of will and deduction have to be traced back to a fundamental paradox of law, the paradox of legal decision-making. We argue that this paradox-oriented approach is not just another variation of decisionism of a Schmittian nature. Rather it goes well beyond decisionism in that it takes account of the societal context of the decisionmaking process and insists on the importance of the legal form and the autonomy of law as a social system. A deconstructivist interpretation further sets the stage for a new conception of the political dimension within law, by pointing out that legal decision-making in the light of undecidability is itself a political act. This conceptionalization calls for an identification of real-world social conflicts and their reformulation within the quaestio iuris.

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