Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing 2007
DOI: 10.1145/1281100.1281172
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Theory of BAR games

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Cited by 21 publications
(23 citation statements)
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“…k-fault tolerant Nash equilibrium requires that a each agent's strategy is still optimal even if up to k agents behave in an arbitrary fashion [12]. The BAR model has three types of agents: Byzantine, rational, and obedient "altruistic" agents who will follow the given protocol even if it is not rational [8,20]. (k, t)-robustness combines both these directions with the possibility that k agents may behave arbitrarily and t agents may collude [1].…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…k-fault tolerant Nash equilibrium requires that a each agent's strategy is still optimal even if up to k agents behave in an arbitrary fashion [12]. The BAR model has three types of agents: Byzantine, rational, and obedient "altruistic" agents who will follow the given protocol even if it is not rational [8,20]. (k, t)-robustness combines both these directions with the possibility that k agents may behave arbitrarily and t agents may collude [1].…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…3 Eliaz [28] and later [17,3,35,18,4] consider coalitions in which all of the deviators may possibly be faulty. 3 The inherent difficulty is that no punishment deters a coalition in which all agents are Byzantine.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…On one hand, we consider joint deviations that are harder to deal with than deviations in which all deviators are rational (as in [6,1,5]) because we assume that not all deviators are rational. On the other hand, we offer equilibria that are more credible than known fault tolerant equilibrium because we consider new realistic system settings of infinitely repeated games in which not all deviators are faulty (as in [28,17,3,35,18,4]). One may think about a subordinate agent as a faulty one.…”
Section: Costs Of Games With Subsystem Takeoversmentioning
confidence: 99%
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