Third Party Characteristics, Territory and the Mediation of Militarized Interstate Disputes

Frazier, Derrick V.

doi:10.1080/07388940600972628

Cited by 23 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 57 publications

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“…Of the authors that examine conflict manager identity, few have generated a population of potential intermediaries and therefore cannot speak to the effects of third-party characteristics or its relationship to the disputants without selecting on the dependent variable (for exceptions to this, see Greig and Regan 2008;Frazier 2006). Examining who manages conflicts therefore necessitates establishing a population of potential managers.…”

Section: Outcome Variables and Model Specificationmentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Ethnic conflicts are highly intractable, and territorial conflicts are the most likely to lead to military conflict (Vasquez 1993;Hensel 1996). Such heightened danger of the likely dispute severity should make them more amenable to mediation since they are more likely to disrupt state interactions (Greig and Regan 2008;Frazier 2004Frazier , 2006. We also consider other characteristics of the third party that might entice the disputants to accept their services, namely the characteristics that signal an effective mediator.…”

Section: Explanatory Variablesmentioning

confidence: 98%

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Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation in International and Civil Wars

Melin

Svensson

2009

International Interactions

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This paper examines the conditions under which warring parties will accept an outside party's offer to mediate. Specifically, we explore variation in the incentives for accepting third-party offers in interstate conflicts as compared to civil wars. We argue that since mediation in civil wars transfers legitimacy to the non-state actor and can generate a precedent of exceptions to the norm of sovereignty, the political cost associated with accepting international mediation will be substantially higher in civil wars compared to international conflicts. States should therefore only accept mediation in the most serious disputes, or when the costs of legitimizing an opponent are outweighed by the benefits of conflict resolution. Building on this theoretical reasoning, the paper analyzes the implications of differences in incentive structures between inter-and intrastate conflicts for offer and acceptance of mediation. We find an empirical discrepancy between interstate and civil wars in regard to demand-side (acceptance) of mediation, and to a somewhat lesser extent the supply-side (offer) of international mediation. In line with our argument, we find that the historical ties between the potential intermediary and at least one of the disputants play different roles in regard to acceptance of mediation in interstate compared to civil wars. This is important to take into consideration in the emerging debate on mediation bias.

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Section: Outcome Variables and Model Specificationmentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Explanatory Variablesmentioning

confidence: 98%

Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation in International and Civil Wars

Melin

Svensson

2009

International Interactions

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“…The main differences were with respect to mediations initiated by third parties, with slightly weaker results (although not insignificant) for the model. This suggests that a modified process is at work in this subset of cases, one in which third party incentives must be incorporated (e.g., Frazier, 2005), and that scholars should be cautious about treating all mediation attempts as equivalent phenomena.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…There are, to our knowledge, no scholarly studies that directly address softening up. Those most relevant deal only with mediation and accordingly focus more on the characteristics of the mediator rather than the parties themselves (Frazier, 2005). Nevertheless, a number of theoretical approaches to international conflict and conflict management offer clues on related points.…”

Section: The Concept Of "Softening Up"mentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Those studies that have explored mediation and negotiation initiation (e.g., Greig, 2005;Frazier, 2005) have identified a number of important factors, but have produced largely modest results. It may be that the factors that promote diplomacy do so only after the disputants have been softened up, thereby producing results that are statistically significant, but not substantively strong, unless one controls for a softening effect.…”

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confidence: 96%

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Softening Up: Making Conflicts More Amenable to Diplomacy

Greig

Diehl

2006

International Interactions

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In this paper, we explore the process by which initially reluctant protagonists come to accept diplomacy to resolve their conflicts; we refer to this as "softening up." Although some studies exploring mediation and negotiation initiation have identified a number of important factors, they have produced largely modest results. These modest findings may reflect the fact that the conditions that promote diplomacy do so only after disputants have been softened up, thereby producing results that are statistically significant, but not substantively strong, unless one controls for a softening effect. In this paper, we develop and test a model of softening up. We do so by studying all pairs of rival states in the period 1946-1995.

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International Rivalry, Territorial Disputes, and Peaceful Dispute Resolution

Thompson

Sakuwa

Suhas

2021

Analyzing Strategic Rivalries in World Politics

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Territorial disputes constitute an important root of interstate conflict. Yet these disputes do not always lead to war or even militarized conflict. Sometimes, one side yields to the other side by withdrawing its claims. Focusing on rival dyads whose territorial claims should be more intractable than is the case in non-rival dyads, we suggest that it is challengers, as opposed to the side that already controls the disputed territory in question, that are more likely to make concessions. Moreover, it is threats external to the spatial rivalry that encourage challengers to surrender their claims so that they may deal with more pressing threats. The empirical evidence supports these contentions. Territorial dispute challengers are more likely to engages in negotiations over the disputed space if they are also participants in other rivalries that, presumably, become associated with threats that are more worrisome than other, older spatial disagreements. One of several implications is that it is debatable whether we should assume that it is primarily boundary negotiations that end spatial disputes and therefore rivalries. On the contrary, the linkages between boundaries and rivalry are apt to be more complicated. Not only are all rivalries not spatial in nature, the way they end need not be due to the peaceful resolution of territorial disputes either.Findings that point to territorial disputes as among the most dangerous causes of international conflict and rivalry are well established in the interstate conflict literature. But not all territorial disputes escalate to war. Nor do all territorial disputes persist until they are resolved by coercive force. How decision-makers navigate their way out of territorial disputes is less well understood. Recourse to legal mechanisms and international law have received recent attention as key processes in efforts to reduce conflict over territory. What is left unclear is why or when decision-makers choose to make use of these legal mechanisms. Equally unclear is who makes use of opportunities to de-escalate territorial disputes. Presumably, states that are already in a rivalry relationship are less likely to walk away from a territorial dispute than states that are not rivals. There is too much psychological baggage and historical inertia to overcome in addition to dealing with the specifics of territorial control. Then, too, rivalries are often defined as manifestations of territorial disputes. Some are. Some are not. Yet, to what extent territorial disputes make rivalry more likely

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Third Party Characteristics, Territory and the Mediation of Militarized Interstate Disputes

Cited by 23 publications

References 57 publications

Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation in International and Civil Wars

Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation in International and Civil Wars

Softening Up: Making Conflicts More Amenable to Diplomacy

International Rivalry, Territorial Disputes, and Peaceful Dispute Resolution

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