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In an effort to contribute to our knowledge of managing territorial disputes, I demonstrate the effects of territory on third party initiated mediation. My findings suggest that previous arguments regarding territorial disputes and mediation are too simplistic. Explaining the effects of territory without consideration of third party characteristics and interaction terms leads to a completely different set of conclusions about the nature of territorial disputes than when these two sets of variables are considered. An analysis of the two different empirical models suggests strong linkages between third party interests and territorial disputes compared to disputes over other issues.

In this article we propose a framework for understanding order within Regional Security Complexes (RSCs), focused upon the importance of regional powers. We argue that there are three factors to consider in adequately explaining regional security with respect to the influence of regional powers: structure, regional power roles, and regional power orientations. The first factor emphasizes the necessary but not sufficient attributes of power and capability for understanding regional security dynamics. The last two factors stress the importance of regional power behavior as being critical to the security process. To this end we highlight three specific roles and sets of orientations that when examined in the context of structural factors, provide a clearer picture of security orders in RSCs.

Motivations for conflict management are rarely discussed in terms of commitments that potential third-parties have toward one or both disputants. The current study addresses this lacuna by examining how alliance designs affect conflict management behavior. Specifically, we argue that third-party states' willingness to manage interstate conflicts depends on both the existence and depth of an alliance relationship. We test this argument using data on conflict management within militarized interstate disputes during the period 1946-2000. We find that allies are more likely than non-allies to manage their partner's disputes. Underneath this aggregate relationship, however, we also find that the depth of alliance commitments strongly influences this behavior. Deeper commitments -both across and within alliance types -increase the likelihood of conflict management significantly.

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