Third-Party Intermediaries and Negotiated Settlements, 1946–2000

Frazier, Derrick V.; Dixon, William J.

doi:10.1080/03050620601011057

Cited by 110 publications

(102 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…Second, conflict management provides status (Frazier and Dixon 2006;Svensson 2007). Negotiating as equals attributes credibility to civil war leaders (Melin and Svensson 2009).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Signs of Trouble: Regional Organization Mediation and Civil War Agreement Durability

Gartner

2011

The Journal of Politics

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“…Second, conflict management provides status (Frazier and Dixon 2006;Svensson 2007). Negotiating as equals attributes credibility to civil war leaders (Melin and Svensson 2009).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Signs of Trouble: Regional Organization Mediation and Civil War Agreement Durability

Gartner

2011

The Journal of Politics

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“…The above criteria offer a method of determining which cases to analyze based on theoretical arguments about likely mediators (Beardsley 2005;Frazier and Dixon 2006;. 3 The process that determines if actors are in the sample is related to the process that determines if they manage the conflict, exerting both direct effects on the dependent variable and indirect ones on the chance of being selected.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation in International and Civil Wars

Melin

Svensson

2009

International Interactions

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This paper examines the conditions under which warring parties will accept an outside party's offer to mediate. Specifically, we explore variation in the incentives for accepting third-party offers in interstate conflicts as compared to civil wars. We argue that since mediation in civil wars transfers legitimacy to the non-state actor and can generate a precedent of exceptions to the norm of sovereignty, the political cost associated with accepting international mediation will be substantially higher in civil wars compared to international conflicts. States should therefore only accept mediation in the most serious disputes, or when the costs of legitimizing an opponent are outweighed by the benefits of conflict resolution. Building on this theoretical reasoning, the paper analyzes the implications of differences in incentive structures between inter-and intrastate conflicts for offer and acceptance of mediation. We find an empirical discrepancy between interstate and civil wars in regard to demand-side (acceptance) of mediation, and to a somewhat lesser extent the supply-side (offer) of international mediation. In line with our argument, we find that the historical ties between the potential intermediary and at least one of the disputants play different roles in regard to acceptance of mediation in interstate compared to civil wars. This is important to take into consideration in the emerging debate on mediation bias.

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“…Although these studies offer impressive support for our theoretical prediction, there is other research, such as Dixon (1996), Rauchhaus (2006), and Frazier & Dixon (2006), that finds that mediation can be effective at increasing the probability of settlement and deescalation of disputes. How does our theoretical argument square with these papers?…”

Section: Analysis Of Information Mediation In Disputesmentioning

confidence: 88%

When Is Shuttle Diplomacy Worth the Commute? Information Sharing through Mediation

Fey¹,

Ramsay²

2010

World Pol.

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We study the conflict mediation problem, sometimes called "shuttle diplomacy," when the mediator acts as a go-between and must gather information from the disputants. In the context of a general model of information mediation, we show that the incentive that disputants have to lie to the mediator undoes any advantage that might be gained by adding communication with a third party. In fact, our main result shows that any equilibrium outcome that is achievable through mediation is also achievable as an equilibrium outcome of a game with unmediated pre-play communication. This is true even when the mediator is allowed to have arbitrary preferences or biases. We then test our empirical prediction on dispute management efforts between 1937 and 1985. The analysis supports the hypothesis that information mediation has no effect in environments where the mediator has no independent source of information.

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Third-Party Intermediaries and Negotiated Settlements, 1946–2000

Cited by 110 publications

References 34 publications

Signs of Trouble: Regional Organization Mediation and Civil War Agreement Durability

Signs of Trouble: Regional Organization Mediation and Civil War Agreement Durability

Incentives for Talking: Accepting Mediation in International and Civil Wars

When Is Shuttle Diplomacy Worth the Commute? Information Sharing through Mediation

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