Tools for Legislative Oversight: An Empirical Investigation

Pelizzo, Riccardo; Stapenhurst, Rick

doi:10.1596/1813-9450-3388

Cited by 61 publications

(17 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…Since 1978, when China altered its economic policies and adopted an open market policy, the rise of corruption in China has also been highlighted by many scholars. ( Ting Gong, 2002, Guzin Bayar 2012, Carlos D. Ramirez, 2014.Despite the obvious relevance of the rule of law for anti -corruption objectives, the literature does not provide much material in this area (Carothers 2003(Bertot, Jaeger, & Grimes, 2010Carothers, 2003;Pelizzo & Stapenhurst, 2004). Most of the interventions point to two issues: supporting the implementation of important laws such as anti-corruption legislation and the strengthening of programs and projects in law enforcement agencies such as police, prosecutorial, police and judicial agencies, and recently, special anti-corruption bodies (Carothers, 2003).…”

Section: Historical Background and Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption Prevention and Economic Growth: A Mediating Effect of Rule of Law

Hongdao¹,

Mumtaz²,

Mukhtar³

et al. 2018

IJSSS

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This article is based on the mediating effect of rule of law between control of corruption and economic growth in China. Many empirical studies have been conducted on the relationship of corruption with economic growth, income, democracy, education, employment rate and the likes. Most of them are based on linear relationship and evaluate the impact of corruption and corruption prevention on different economic and social variables. But the study under consideration is focusing upon the role of rule of law in control of corruption and economic growth in China. It puts forth a question that what kind of effects rule of law put on economic growth and corruption prevention. The top seven economies of the world have been selected and data has been extracted from the Worldwide Governance indicators of the World Bank. In order to address the above question, the study was divided into two major parts. First, the author has applied regression analyses to see the relationship among the economic growth, rule of law and corruption; and also the impact of economic growth and control of corruption on rule of law. Then, mediation analysis has been conducted to see if rule of law plays a role in control of corruption and economic growth. The results show that economic growth significantly improve the level of control of corruption and rule of law plays a partial intermediary role in the process of economic development to enhance the corruption prevention. Second, the author has discussed the condition of rule of law and corruption in the era of the current leader, Xi Jinping and before 2012.

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Section: Historical Background and Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Corruption Prevention and Economic Growth: A Mediating Effect of Rule of Law

Hongdao¹,

Mumtaz²,

Mukhtar³

et al. 2018

IJSSS

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“…The survey data collected by the IPU were initially used in a set of papers (Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2004a;Pelizzo and Stapenhurst, 2004b) and were subsequently used in a monograph (Yamamoto, 2007).…”

Section: The Organization Of Pacsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Public Accounts Committees in Eastern Africa: A Comparative Analysis

Pelizzo

Kinyondo

2014

SSRN Journal

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Properly functioning Public Accounts Committees (PACs) are essential for promoting good governance, preventing misallocation of resources and curbing corruption. The purpose of the present paper is to analyze the organization, powers and the performance of East Africa's PACs so as to understand what they do, what makes them work well and what could make them work better. 2 The analysis reveals that the Tanzania's PAC is the most active in the region because while it has fewer resources at its disposal than its Eastern African counterparts, it makes a more efficient use of the available resources as indicated by the fact that the Tanzanian Pac was able to carry out more oversight activities than the other PACs operating in the region in spite of having fewer resources. This evidence sustains the claim that legislators' political will is the single most important determinant of effective oversight. On the basis of the evidence presented in the paper, we formulate two policy recommendations: that in order to secure a more effective PAC performance, international organizations should pay greater attention to ensuring that legislators have the will to be effective overseers and that the Tanzania's PAC needs to be more adequately staffed and resourced.

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“…By contrast, Gerring and Thacker (2004), Gerring et al (2005), and Lederman et al (2005) discovered that nations with fewer veto points in the political system (i.e., those in which executive and legislative functions are fused, as in parliamentary systems) have lower levels of corruption. There are fewer studies under the second approach, but noteworthy are Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2008) and Stapenhurst (2011), which found that countries with more oversight tools (i.e., where legislatures, acting as principals, have more tools with which to oversee actions by the executive) have lower levels of wrongdoing.…”

Section: Causes Of Corruptionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Alternatively, one could consider whether the oversight methods are established inside the parliament (questions, question time, interpellations, hearings, public account committee) or outside (ombudsman and auditor general). Some studies have investigated the relationship between oversight tools and socioeconomic as well as political conditions (Maffio 2002;Pelizzo and Stapenhurst 2004;Pennings 2000). The most important conclusion is that oversight is not solely a derivative of other variables but has a dynamic of its own.…”

Section: • Public Integrity Summer 2014mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…5 Nor can they be reduced to the distinction between consensus and majoritarian democracies (Lijphart 1999) or, contra Linz (1994), to the distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems. While Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2004) showed that parliamentary systems are, on average, better equipped to perform the oversight function, later work has shown that the form of government has no statistical influence on the effectiveness of oversight and its ability to influence the functioning of a political system. Pelizzo and Stapenhurst (2006) showed in this respect that while the number of oversight tools and the level of socioeconomic development are key determinants of whether a country is a formal democracy or a liberal democracy, the probability that it is one or the other is not significantly related to the form of government once one controls for the number of oversight tools and level of development.…”

Section: • Public Integrity Summer 2014mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Corruption and Legislatures

Stapenhurst

Jacobs

Pelizzo³

2014

Public Integrity

Self Cite

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The control of corruption is an important element of governance and a stated goal of many governments. Legislative oversight is an acknowledged mechanism for controlling corruption, but little research has been undertaken on this subject, and national anticorruption strategies generally ignore the legislature. This article addresses the question of whether legislative oversight helps to curb perceived corruption, and if so, how. Statistical analysis using data from a global survey of 82 legislatures found that the presence of legislative oversight tools explains a major proportion of the variance in perceived levels of wrongdoing in countries with presidential forms of government, but much less in countries with semipresidential governments and less yet again in parliamentary systems. The analysis also found that the effectiveness of legislative oversight instruments varies by form of government. In presidential countries the most important instruments are committee hearings, hearings in plenary, and ombuds offices; in semipresidential countries they are question time, interpellations, and ombuds, while in parliamentary systems interpellations are the most important. These findings demonstrate that while the oversight apparatus is useful in helping curb malfeasance, not all tools are equally effective, and what works for some forms of government may not work as well, or at all, in other systems. Clearly, the "one size fits all" approach is inadequate when it comes to legislative corruption control.

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Tools for Legislative Oversight: An Empirical Investigation

Cited by 61 publications

References 17 publications

Corruption Prevention and Economic Growth: A Mediating Effect of Rule of Law

Corruption Prevention and Economic Growth: A Mediating Effect of Rule of Law

Public Accounts Committees in Eastern Africa: A Comparative Analysis

Corruption and Legislatures

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