Towards Secure Analog Designs: A Secure Sense Amplifier Using Memristors

Hoe, David H. K.; Rajendran, Jeyavijayan; Karri, Ramesh

doi:10.1109/isvlsi.2014.50

Cited by 31 publications

(31 citation statements)

References 31 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…The majority of published works on locking consider inserting a lock into the biasing circuitry of the analog IC, such that unless the correct key is applied the analog IC is incorrectly biased, thus resulting in one or more performances residing outside the specification limits. In [16], it is proposed to lock the body-biasing of a matched transistor pair with a lock mechanism that is based on a memristor crossbar, where the key-bits control the programming of the memristors. In [17], it is proposed to replace the transistors used to set the biasing with parallel-connected transistors.…”

Section: Prior Art In Analog Ic Locking and Obfuscationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analog and Mixed-Signal IC Security via Sizing Camouflaging

Leonhard

Sayed

Louërat

et al. 2021

IEEE Trans. Comput.-Aided Des. Integr. Circuits Syst.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We treat the problem of analog Integrated Circuit (IC) obfuscation towards Intellectual Property (IP) protection against reverse engineering. Obfuscation is achieved by camouflaging the effective geometry of layout components via the use of fake contacts, which originally were proposed for gate camouflaging in digital ICs. We present a library of obfuscated layout components, we give recommendations for effective camouflaging, we discuss foreseen attacks and the achieved resiliency, and we propose security metrics for assessing the hardness of reverse engineering. The proposed methodology is demonstrated on an operational amplifier and an RF Σ∆ Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC).

show abstract

Section: Prior Art In Analog Ic Locking and Obfuscationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Analog and Mixed-Signal IC Security via Sizing Camouflaging

Leonhard

Sayed

Louërat

et al. 2021

IEEE Trans. Comput.-Aided Des. Integr. Circuits Syst.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In [10], the sense amplifiers used to read out the contents of a memory are locked via the body biasing of one of the transistors in their input differential pair. The locking scheme is based on memristors.…”

Section: Previous Work On Analog Ic Lockingmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…All three aforementioned approaches [10]- [12] are vulnerable to removal attacks since a smart attacker can simply remove the obfuscated biasing circuit and replace it with a "fresh" one with no locking mechanism. The attacker does not have to recover the key; it suffices to recover the biases, which typically are not so many.…”

Section: Previous Work On Analog Ic Lockingmentioning

confidence: 99%

MixLock: Securing Mixed-Signal Circuits via Logic Locking

Leonhard

Yasin

Turk

et al. 2019

2019 Design, Automation &Amp; Test in Europe Conference &Amp; Exhibition (DATE)

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this paper, we propose a hardware security methodology for mixed-signal Integrated Circuits (ICs). The proposed methodology can be used as a countermeasure for IC piracy, including counterfeiting and reverse engineering. It relies on logic locking of the digital section of the mixed-signal IC, such that unless the correct key is provided, the mixed-signal performance will be pushed outside of the acceptable specification range. We employ a state-of-the-art logic locking technique, called Stripped Functionality Logic Locking (SFLL). We show that strong security levels are achieved in both mixed-signal and digital domains. In addition, the proposed methodology presents several appealing properties. It is non-intrusive for the analog section, it incurs reasonable area and power overhead, it can be fully automated, and it is virtually applicable to a wide range of mixed-signal ICs. We demonstrate it on a Σ∆ Analog-to-Digital Converter (ADC).

show abstract

“…Its cell size has been shown to be smaller than other NVRAM technologies at 4F 2 (F is the feature size of the technology node) [33]. Additionally, it has been used recently to secure memory designs against unauthorized read accesses [31]. RRAM provides a non-volatile configuration memory for SBs so chips do not have to be reconfigured when the power is cycled, making chip boot-up more secure since there is no need for potentially insecure programming sequences to be sent to the chip.…”

Section: F Error Monitorsmentioning

confidence: 99%

TPAD: Hardware Trojan Prevention and Detection for Trusted Integrated Circuits

Ganesan

et al. 2016

IEEE Trans. Comput.-Aided Des. Integr. Circuits Syst.

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Abstract-There are increasing concerns about possible malicious modifications of integrated circuits (ICs) used in critical applications. Such attacks are often referred to as hardware Trojans. While many techniques focus on hardware Trojan detection during IC testing, it is still possible for attacks to go undetected. Using a combination of new design techniques and new memory technologies, we present a new approach that detects a wide variety of hardware Trojans during IC testing and also during system operation in the field. Our approach can also prevent a wide variety of attacks during synthesis, place-and-route, and fabrication of ICs. It can be applied to any digital system, and can be tuned for both traditional and split-manufacturing methods. We demonstrate its applicability for both ASICs and FPGAs. Using fabricated test chips with Trojan emulation capabilities and also using simulations, we demonstrate: 1. The area and power costs of our approach can range between 7.4-165% and 0.07-60%, respectively, depending on the design and the attacks targeted; 2. The speed impact can be minimal (close to 0%); 3. Our approach can detect 99.998% of Trojans (emulated using test chips) that do not require detailed knowledge of the design being attacked; 4. Our approach can prevent 99.98% of specific attacks (simulated) that utilize detailed knowledge of the design being attacked (e.g., through reverse-engineering). 5. Our approach never produces any false positives, i.e., it does not report attacks when the IC operates correctly. I. INTRODUCTION HERE is growing concern about the trustworthiness of integrated circuits (ICs). If an untrusted party fabricates an IC, there is potential for an adversary to insert a malicious hardware Trojan [1], an unauthorized modification of the IC resulting in incorrect functionality and/or sensitive data being exposed [2]. These include (but are not limited to) [3]: a) Modification of functional behavior through logic changes: Index TermsFor example, extra logic gates may be inserted to force an incorrect logic value on a wire at some (arbitrary) point in time (Fig. 1a) [2]. b) Electrical modification: For example, extra capacitive loading may be placed on a circuit path to alter timing characteristics of the IC (Fig. 1b) [2]. c) Reliability degradation: For example, aging of transistors (e.g., Negative Bias Temperature Instability (NBTI)) may be accelerated, degrading reliability ( Fig. 1c) [4]. A hardware Trojan is detected when we report malicious modifications to an IC. A hardware Trojan is prevented when Manuscript received January 9, 2015; revised May 8, 2015; accepted July 20, 2015. Work supported by IARPA Trusted Integrated Chips (TIC) Program. All authors are with Dept. of Electrical Engineering, Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 USA (e-mail: tonyfwu@stanford.edu). S. Mitra is also with Dept. of Computer Science, Stanford University.we stop a hardware Trojan from being inserted. Part of the challenge in detecting or preventing hardware Trojans arises from the fact that...

show abstract

Towards Secure Analog Designs: A Secure Sense Amplifier Using Memristors

Cited by 31 publications

References 31 publications

Analog and Mixed-Signal IC Security via Sizing Camouflaging

Analog and Mixed-Signal IC Security via Sizing Camouflaging

MixLock: Securing Mixed-Signal Circuits via Logic Locking

TPAD: Hardware Trojan Prevention and Detection for Trusted Integrated Circuits

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About