Traffic congestion pricing via network congestion game approach

Zhang, Jing; Lu, Jianquan; Cao, Jinde; Huang, Wei; Guo, Jianhua; Wang, Yun

doi:10.3934/dcdss.2020378

Cited by 10 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…Congestion game theory is particularly suitable for traffic systems. Recently, using STP to formulate traffic congestion games, [72] proposed an optimal utility design technique. Another interesting result is about dynamics and convergence of hyper-networked evolutionary games with time delay in strategies [71].…”

Section: Congestion Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Comprehensive Survey on STP Approach to Finite Games

Cheng¹,

Wu²,

Zhao³

et al. 2021

Preprint

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Nowadays the semi-tensor product (STP) approach to finite games has become a promising new direction. This paper provides a comprehensive survey on this prosperous field. After a brief introduction for STP and finite (networked) games, a description for the principle and fundamental technique of STP approach to finite games is presented. Then several problems and recent results about theory and applications of finite games via STP are presented. A brief comment about the potential use of STP to artificial intelligence is also proposed.

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Section: Congestion Gamesmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Comprehensive Survey on STP Approach to Finite Games

Cheng¹,

Wu²,

Zhao³

et al. 2021

Preprint

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“…Papers [6]- [8] model the charging stations as selfish revenue-maximizing agents, whereas [9] describes a game for modeling the regulatory aspects such as taxes and transportation prices as well as the operational matters for mobility service providers. From the perspective of congestion control in urban networks, different tolling mechanisms, congestion taxes, and congestion-aware routing schemes have been proposed in [10]- [13] based on the congestion game vehicle routing. Even though the upper-level goal of our method could be identically chosen, our underlying pricing model lies at the intersection of aggregative games and the inherent leader-follower structure present in the Stackelberg and reverse Stackelberg games [14].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Hierarchical Pricing Game for Balancing the Charging of Ride-Hailing Electric Fleets

Maljkovic

Nilsson

Geroliminis

2023

IEEE Trans. Contr. Syst. Technol.

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Due to the ever-increasing popularity of ridehailing services and the indisputable shift towards alternative fuel vehicles, the intersection of the ride-hailing market and smart electric mobility provides an opportunity to trade different services to achieve societal optimum. In this work, we present a hierarchical, game-based, control mechanism for balancing the simultaneous charging of multiple ridehailing fleets. The mechanism takes into account sometimes conflicting interests of the ride-hailing drivers, the ride-hailing company management, and the external agents such as power-providing companies or city governments that will play a significant role in charging management in the future. The upper-level control considers charging price incentives and models the interactions between the external agents and ride-hailing companies as a Reverse Stackelberg game with a single leader and multiple followers. The lower-level control motivates the revenue-maximizing drivers to follow the company operator's requests through surge pricing and models the interactions as a single leader, multiple followers Stackelberg game. We provide a pricing mechanism that ensures the existence of a unique Nash equilibrium of the upper-level game that minimizes the external agent's objective at the same time. We provide theoretical and experimental robustness analysis of the upper-level control with respect to parameters whose values depend on sensitive information that might not be entirely accessible to the external agent. For the lowerlevel algorithm, we combine the Nash equilibrium of the upper-level game with a quadratic mixed integer optimization problem to find the optimal surge prices. Finally, we illustrate the performance of the control mechanism in a case study based on real taxi data from Shenzhen in China.

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“…Each potential game possesses at least one pure Nash equilibrium (NE) and will converge to NE under certain strategy updating rule (SUR). Due to these good properties, potential games have been used to tackle various practical problems, including resource allocation 9 , wireless sensor networks 10 and traffic congestion 11 .…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

On Equivalence of State Based Potential Games

Wang

2023

Preprint

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By the method of semi-tensor product of matrices, state based potential games are investigated. Firstly, using the potential equation, a necessary and sufficient condition and a sufficient condition are proposed, respectively, to verify whether a state based game is potential. Then two static equivalence conditions of state based potential games are presented. Furthermore, the dynamic equivalence is given such that the state based games dynamically equivalent to the state based potential games have similar dynamic properties. Lastly, the concept of state based networked evolutionary games is proposed. A necessary and sufficient condition is given to assure a state based networked evolutionary game is potential.

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Traffic congestion pricing via network congestion game approach

Cited by 10 publications

References 26 publications

A Comprehensive Survey on STP Approach to Finite Games

A Comprehensive Survey on STP Approach to Finite Games

Hierarchical Pricing Game for Balancing the Charging of Ride-Hailing Electric Fleets

On Equivalence of State Based Potential Games

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