Transparency and Falsity in Descartes's Theory of Ideas

García, Claudia Lorena

doi:10.1080/096725599341802

Cited by 1 publication

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“…39 On another version, MFI fails 35 This is stressed by Wells (1984, 44-7), Hoffman (1996, 371), and Clemenson (2007, 86-7). 36 Bolton (1986, and Garcı´a (1999). These interpretations, which distinguish ''representing'' from ''seeming to represent,'' differ in two ways from the ''equivocalist'' reading I am defending.…”

Section: Against Univocalist Readingsmentioning

confidence: 96%

“…36 36 Bolton (1986, 394–5) and García (1999). These interpretations, which distinguish “representing” from “seeming to represent,” differ in two ways from the “equivocalist” reading I am defending.…”

mentioning

confidence: 96%

“…63 63 Here I endorse the analysis of García (1999, 355–6, 368n30). But García and I apply referral and conformity in reverse: she holds that MFI conforms to the supposed privation cold, and is referred to a sensation.…”

mentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Univocalists have proposed at least four readings, none with textual support. Wells (1984, 46–9) sees Descartes’s claim that he is taking ideas “materially” as evidence that he is concerned not with what objects they represent, but with whether their representational status is “defective.”García (1999, 354–6) holds that taking an idea “materially” is considering it with regard to what it seems to represent. Others hold that one is considering an idea “materially” as long as one isn’t considering it as representing an extramental object (Secada 2000, 98–102) or an actually existing extramental object (Field 1993, 322–3).…”

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confidence: 99%

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Objective Being and “Ofness” in Descartes

Shapiro

2011

Philos Phenomenol Research

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It is generally assumed that Descartes invokes “objective being in the intellect” in order to explain or describe an idea’s status as being “of something.” I argue that this assumption is mistaken. As emerges in his discussion of “materially false ideas” in the Fourth Replies, Descartes recognizes two senses of ‘idea of’. One, a theoretical sense, is itself introduced in terms of objective being. Hence Descartes can’t be introducing objective being to explain or describe “ofness” understood in this sense. Descartes also appeals to a pretheoretical sense of ‘idea of’. I will argue that the notion of objective being can’t serve to explain or describe this “ofness” either. I conclude by proposing an alternative explanation of the role of objective being, according to which Descartes introduces this notion to explain the mind’s ability to attain clear and distinct ideas.

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Section: Against Univocalist Readingsmentioning

confidence: 96%

mentioning

confidence: 96%

mentioning

confidence: 98%

mentioning

confidence: 99%

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