Trends and Applications in Stackelberg Security Games

Kar, Debarun; Nguyen, Thanh H.; Fang, Fei; Brown, Matthew; Sinha, Arunesh; Tambe, Milind; Jiang, Albert Xin

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-44374-4_27

Cited by 12 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Some suggested that understanding how individuals perceive risk is vital to understanding the behaviour of attackers (Ridinger et al 2016). Not long ago, for instance, it has been pointed out that in the cyber-security domain the interaction between the defender and the adversary is quite complicated with a high degree of incomplete information and uncertainty (Kar et al 2017).…”

Section: Discussion and Concluding Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We prepared this paper with the main aim to provide a survey of selected cases of real-world deployed applications of the game-theoretic Stackelberg model and, also, to discuss some further potential applications based on it in a specifi c public domain, security. Another motivation to prepare the paper was the fact that the Stackelberg model has been applied es-pecially in Western democracies (and especially in the USA - Kar et al 2017), and such cases may be inspiring for creators of public policies in the security areas in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) region. Th e paper is divided into a theoretical and an applied part.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Using Game Theory in Public Domains: The Potential and Limitations of Security Games

Špačková

Špaček

2020

NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy

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Since its origins, when it was mainly connected to the field of economics, game theory has brought important theoretic insights into many domains. Besides biology, philosophy or computer science, its findings have been applied to various fields of public policy. One specific area of public policy is that of security. Within the last two decades we have been witnesses to a significant increase in efforts to model security issues using tools of game theory and to derive political implications. The paper deals with the model of a Stackelberg security game and its real-world applications in security domains. The main aim and purpose of the paper is to provide a survey of selected cases of real-world deployed applications of the game-theoretic Stackelberg model in the area of public security and, based on the literature analysis, to discuss the potential and limitations of the model for policy- and decision-makers that are dealing with security measures on various governmental levels. Existing cases clearly indicate that the model can contribute to a better design and implementation of the security policy and help implement a better allocation of resources and thus potentially improve the effectiveness of security measures. On the other hand, the paper also discusses some limitations and potential future adjustments of the model together with points for further research.

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Section: Discussion and Concluding Remarksmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Using Game Theory in Public Domains: The Potential and Limitations of Security Games

Špačková

Špaček

2020

NISPAcee Journal of Public Administration and Policy

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“…Security games 3‐5 are a special type of Bayesian Stackelberg game with only one type of leader (defender) but still many possible types of the follower (attacker). Moreover, it assumes that for each pure strategy profile, either the defender or the attacker wins and the other loses.…”

Section: Preliminariesmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The problem of modelling uncertainty has become a key challenge in the realm of security. Existing approaches are primarily based on Bayesian Stackelberg games, which model probabilistic uncertainty over the attacker's motivation 3‐5 . Paruchuri et al 41 provide a mixed‐integer linear programming formulation for solving Bayesian Stackelberg games.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Since today the public security issue is so crucial, 1,2 it is very significant to decide how to allocate limited security resources for the success of security operations globally 3‐6 . Most existing studies address this issue using a special type of (Bayesian) Stackelberg game, known as a security game with two players (a defender and an attacker).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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A decision support framework for security resource allocation under ambiguity

Liu

McAreavey

et al. 2020

Int J Intell Syst

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There has been increasing interest in using Stackelberg game (known as a security game) to allocate limited security resources against different attacker types with a specific probability distribution. However, real problems of this kind often face ambiguous information, such as imprecise, unreliable and absent payoffs, and ambiguous assignments of these payoffs. To this end, based on decision theory and the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence, this paper proposes a novel framework that can handle these common types of ambiguity. More specifically, this paper deploys the underlying principles of existing rules from decision theory, as a way to characterise different attitudes to ambiguity, during the transformation of ambiguous payoffs into point-valued payoffs. Hence, our framework holds some good properties: (i) it subsumes traditional security games without ambiguous payoffs, (ii) a uniform margin of error will not affect the results and (iii) the influence

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AI Alignment of Disaster Resilience Management Support Systems

Skulimowski

Bañuls

2021

Artificial Intelligence and Soft Computing

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Trends and Applications in Stackelberg Security Games

Cited by 12 publications

References 31 publications

Using Game Theory in Public Domains: The Potential and Limitations of Security Games

Using Game Theory in Public Domains: The Potential and Limitations of Security Games

A decision support framework for security resource allocation under ambiguity

AI Alignment of Disaster Resilience Management Support Systems

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