Trust and Mistrust in International Relations

Kydd, Andrew H.

doi:10.1515/9780691188515

Cited by 326 publications

(192 citation statements)

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“…Even if the coercing state backs down, the other state may make preparations for war and choose to fight one. 38 Kydd (2005) is a partial exception because increased relative capabilities of an adversary may on occasion make it more trusting and thereby result in a net improvement of a threatening state's expected utility. 36 Grosse Politik,v.…”

Section: Example 5 (Resource Drain)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy: How Communication Matters

Trager

2010

Am Polit Sci Rev

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W hen states come to believe that other states are hostile to their interests, they often reorient their foreign policies by realigning alliance commitments, building arms, striking first, mobilizing troops, or adopting policies to drain the resources of states that menace them. This article presents a crisis bargaining model that allows threatened states a wider array of responses than the choice to back down or not. Two implications are that (1) "cheap talk" diplomatic statements by adversaries can affect perceptions of intentions, and (2) war can occur because resolved states decline to communicate their intentions, even though they could, and even though doing so would avoid a war. The model relates the content and quality of diplomatic signals to the context of prior beliefs about intentions and strategic options. In simulations, this form of diplomatic communication reduces the likelihood of conflict.

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Section: Example 5 (Resource Drain)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy: How Communication Matters

Trager

2010

Am Polit Sci Rev

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“…For players with extreme goals, the value for the compromise would be much lower than the value of total victory. variables also affect trustworthiness; raising an actor's payoff for war by increasing its relative power and decreasing its costs of war tends to make it untrustworthy (Kydd 2005). More moderate types, by contrast, have abandoned extremist ambitions and place a relatively high value on the compromise in comparison to total victory.…”

Section: Lemma 1 Unilateral Defection Beats Mutual Defection Which Bmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…I argue that the best model of the security dilemma combines these two games in an incomplete information setting, as in the trust game below, see alsoKydd 2005. I argue that the best model of the security dilemma combines these two games in an incomplete information setting, as in the trust game below, see alsoKydd 2005. …”

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confidence: 93%

When Can Mediators Build Trust?

2006

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M ediation is one of the most widespread techniques for preventing conflict and promoting cooperation. I examine the conditions under which mediators can facilitate cooperation by building trust between two parties. Assuming mediators have no intrinsic commitment to honesty, they can be credible trust builders in one-round interactions only if they care about the issue at stake, have a moderate ideal point, and do not find conflict to be too costly. A mediator that is solely interested in promoting cooperation, or one that is biased toward one side, will be ineffective. A desire to preserve a reputation for honesty can overcome a limited amount of bias or issue indifference.

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“…The key question of this article concerns the role of trust in the EU decision‐making process and, consequently, the way in which ‘trusting relationships’ matter for the EU's power in international relations during crisis. The EU has often been mentioned by International Relations scholars as a case wherein trust, over time, facilitated international collaboration (Booth and Wheeler, ; Kydd, ; Mercer, , pp. 525–529).…”

Section: Trust Decision‐making and Eu Power In Crisismentioning

confidence: 99%

Trust and Decision‐making in Times of Crisis: The EU's Response to the Events in Ukraine

Natorski

Pomorska

2016

J of Common Market Studies

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It is a common assumption that through decades of co‐operation there has been an emergence of trust between the Member States of the European Union. Yet, we have little evidence about the nature of trust and its implications for decision‐making, in particular in times of crisis. Hence, our article's central question: how does trust matter in the process of decision‐making during crisis? Our argument is that uncertainty during the crisis enabled trust‐building between the actors: Member States and European institutions. In the case of the Ukrainian crisis, this happened in parallel to the decreasing levels of trust in EU–Russia relations. Consequently, the EU was able to agree and implement the instruments of coercive power. To illustrate our argument, we look at the adoption of EU sanctions in reaction to the annexation of Crimea, the downing of the Malaysian Airlines MH17 plane and the war in Donbass.

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Trust and Mistrust in International Relations

Cited by 326 publications

References 0 publications

Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy: How Communication Matters

Diplomatic Calculus in Anarchy: How Communication Matters

When Can Mediators Build Trust?

Trust and Decision‐making in Times of Crisis: The EU's Response to the Events in Ukraine

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