UK diplomacy at the UN after Brexit: Challenges and Opportunities

Abstract

The outcome of the UK's EU referendum will have far-reaching implications for its foreign policy and diplomacy and raises fundamental questions of how 'Brexit' will impact its relationships with Europe and the world. This is even more pertinent when looked at from the perspective of the UN where the UK has benefited considerably from its membership of the EU. This article presents the challenges and opportunities of Brexit for the UK's diplomacy, and influence, at the UN. First, we illustrate the importance of political and regional groups within the UN. Second, we analyse how the UK has worked within such groups, and above all the EU, in two cases: human rights and nuclear weapons issues. Finally, we reflect upon how Brexit is expected to impact UK diplomacy in a UN dominated by group politics, arguing that any rewiring of UK diplomatic channels must continue to account for EU positions.

Subcontracting, facilitating and qualities of regional power: the UK’s partial pivot to Asia

“…Finally, Britain's post-Brexit role in Asian affairs is risked via alienation within multilateral settings. As already described, regional partners like Japan court the UK's elevated position in the United Nations, and with political factions central to twentyfirst century multilateralism, that position has been bolstered and amplified by communal EU membership (Dee and Smith 2017). A rhetorical theme of Britain's pivot to Asia has been a commitment to the rules-based international order (FCO 2012(FCO , 2014(FCO , 2015, with London marketing itself as a networked, bridging facilitator to this end; Bwhen the United States is shifting its focus towards the region and we wish to see the European Union take a more active role, there is a great deal for us to work on with them^, noted William Hague (FCO 2012).…”

“…The durability of this Border^is of increasing interest to the Philippines, Vietnam, Taiwan and others, as they pursue UN legal rulings against China's claims in the South China Sea (BBC 2016). As among the UN's most influential members (Dee and Smith 2017), with corresponding persuasive influence (Henriksen 2005, p. 67), the UK recently made tentative commitments to protect Freedom of Navigation laws in response to China's claims (Parameswaran 2017). It is also part of the influential G7 which reinforces the claims of China's neighbours, helping to ensure the continuation of debate (G7 2017).…”

British foreign policy after Brexit: losing Europe and finding a role

“…90 Brexit is also widely believed to reduce the influence Britain can wield through the UN system. 91 A recent example is Britain's failure to win support in the UN General Assembly for its candidate as judge in the International Court of Justice (ICJ), leaving Britain without an ICJ judge for the first time in the court's history. Described as "a humiliating blow to British international prestige", it might be seen as a harbinger of Britain's reduced status in the UN and on the international stage more generally.…”

Post-Brexit EU/UK security cooperation: NATO, CSDP+, or ‘French connection’?

“…Britain is one of only two EU countries able to deploy close to full-spectrum military capabilities, representing one quarter of the Union’s total defence capabilities (Black et al, 2017), and has been the fourth largest contributor to the EU budget (Herszenhorn and Ariès, 2017). The EU also loses one of its two member states with permanent seats on the UN Security Council (UNSC) (Dee and Smith, 2017: 529–530) as well as the benefits of the UK’s considerable diplomatic networks, including the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’ (Chalmers, 2017: 1; Oliver and Williams, 2016: 547; Rees, 2017: 561). Meanwhile, Brexit deprives the UK of access to key decision-making forums and institutional structures, including the Foreign Affairs Council (FAC), the Political and Security Committee (PSC), the European Defence Agency (EDA), and Europol (Dijkstra, 2016: 1; Wright, 2017).…”