Uncertainty, Political Clientelism, and Voter Turnout in Latin America: Why Parties Conduct Rallies in Argentina

Las señales del compromiso: Movilización política, manifestaciones públicas de apoyo y actos partidarios en la Argentina

“…En la Argentina, la participación de los votantes en los actos partidarios y en las elecciones está muy bien documentada (Auyero 2000;Levitsky 2003;Szwarcberg 2012). Desde 1983, el país ha asistido a la consolidación del clientelismo en un proceso democrático competitivo que incluyó la alternancia de partidos en la presidencia de la nación y un grado considerable de rivalidad en el plano subnacional, donde están establecidos los aparatos partidarios.…”

Argentina’s Politicized Bureaucracy: A Historical Analysis of Two Political Regimes

“…The personalization of public administration in Argentina -through favours and political patronage-has been widely investigated (Calvo & Murillo, 2004Oliveros, 2016;Szwarcberg, 2012;Zarazaga, 2014). Clientelism can be defined as the unequal relationship of power based on exchanges of political favours for material benefits, or "the proffering of material goods in return for electoral support" (Stokes, 2011, p. 649).…”

“…A recent study (Oliveros, 2016), for instance, eloquently links clientelism with the powerful role of political brokers to provide services to citizens that exceed the exchange of mere goods and social benefits. A first approximation to the matter would lead one to believe that there is a tacit relationship between public administrators and elected representatives, whereby the former are pressed or coerced to comply with the political agenda of these groups in power (Calvo & Murillo, 2004Oliveros, 2016;Szwarcberg, 2012;Zarazaga, 2014). However, a closer analysis unveils a complex political network behind the personalized interactions between public administrators and citizens as mediated by brokers.…”

The Microfoundations of Political Clientelism: Lessons from the Argentine Case

“…The two major parties, the Radical Civic Union (Unión Cívica Radical, UCR) and the Justicialist (Peronist) Party (Partido Justicialista, PJ), maintain territorial control over most municipalities by combining a recollection of shared watershed historical events with clientelistic inducements (Torre 2005;Auyero 2000;Levitsky 2003;Calvo and Murillo 2004;Szwarcberg 2009), creating "communities of fate" (Wellhofer 1979: 171) and "electorates of belonging" (Panebianco 1988: 267). By making comparisons across municipalities in two provinces with different political traditions, Buenos Aires and Córdoba, I am able to test the effects of partisanship on candidates' decisions whether or not to use clientelistic strategies of mobilization.…”

“…Building on Szwarcberg (2010), I expect clientelistic candidates to prefer monitoring voter participation at rallies rather than at elections because rally performance is easier to measure and reward than voter turnout at elections. Szwarcberg's study of voter turnout in Argentina argues that clientelistic candidates tend to rely on clientelism to mobilize voters to participate in both, rallies and elections, and monitor both political events accordingly.…”