Urban governance, neoliberalism and housing reform in China

Abstract

Since 1979, housing reforms in China have been seen as successive state efforts to improve urban governance. The idea is that the state has all along failed to deliver housing efficiently and equitably through the work units and that it is believed that only through the recommodification of housing could the housing problem be ultimately resolved. The housing monetarization policy (HMP) was thus launched in 1998 to replace the long-standing in-kind housing subsidy under the old welfare housing system. The policy aims at providing workers with cash subsidies as part of their wage package to enable them to buy or rent their homes from the market. The purpose of this paper is to explain the implications of the HMP through a neoliberal urbanization perspective. Through the case study of Guiyang, it is argued that while the HMP is successful in improving certain historical housing inequalities, it does not primarily aim at eradicating housing inequalities. HMP has in fact led to more rather than less horizontal inequities. In addition, it is argued here that a market housing system is leading towards increasing urban poverty, greater social polarization and James Lee, PhD, is Associate Professor at

Why Does the Government Fail to Improve the Living Conditions of Migrant Workers in Shanghai? Reflections on the Policies and the Implementations of Public Rental Housing under Neoliberalism

“…Commercial housing has become a primary source of fiscal income for the local government, which gives rise to a massive scale of demolish-rebuilt pattern in urban China (He & Wu 2009, p. 288). Housing reform, which is one of the most influential transformations since the open-up reform in 1978, has led to larger social inequality and spatial segregation (Lee 2000;Lee & Zhu 2006;Yu 2006). In the case of Shanghai, in order to beautify the city, generate revenues and compete with other global cities, Shanghai has witnessed an unprecedented scale of housing commodification following the approach of demolishrebuild pattern (He & Wu 2009;He 2010).…”

“…It becomes a global hegemonic discourse in the political and economic development. One of the conspicuous outcomes of neoliberalism is the class restructure and the redistribution of wealth, creating new poverty and social exclusion (Lee & Zhu 2006;Harvey 2007). China is widely recognised as a neoliberal state built on marketisation with strong state controls (Harvey 2007;Wu 2010).…”

The resurgence of public housing provision in China: the Chongqing programme

“…Meanwhile, Chinese neoliberalisation has restructured interactions among the state, market and local governments, which has allowed local governments to withdraw land supply and finance for developing public housing, even though this tenure had been a mainstay for most households under the previous economic regime ( Lee & Zhu, 2006;Wu, 2001;Yao et al, 2014;Ye & Wu, 2008). This housing provision bias has created a number of serious problems: shortages in low-cost (public) housing, income-based housing inequalities, poor housing conditions, etc.…”

“…This housing provision bias has created a number of serious problems: shortages in low-cost (public) housing, income-based housing inequalities, poor housing conditions, etc. (Huang & Jiang 2009;Lee & Zhu 2006;Logan et al, 2010;Wang et al, 2012). Consequently, the state has been under severe pressures, and ostensibly in recent years, determined to focus on the resurgence of public housing, especially in the form of public rental housing (PRH) (see Chen et al, 2014;Wang & Murie, 2011).…”

Uneven compensation and relocation for displaced residents: The case of Nanjing

“…The existing literature has focused on the politicaleconomic reasons for displacement. Western classical theories, such as global urbanism, neo-liberalism and gentrification, are used to explain redevelopment mechanisms (Cartier, 2002;He & Wu, 2009;Lee & Zhu, 2006). Other literature has focused on the implementation process involved.…”