US export control policy and Wassenaar Arrangement

Updating the Wassenaar debate once again: Surveillance, intrusion software, and ambiguity

“…This recommendation can be accompanied with a corollary. 15 The Wassenaar debate supports the arguments that the concept of dual-use has already long ago lost most of its analytical power (Burkart and McCourt, 2017;Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2018;Rath et al, 2014;Rajeswari, 1998;Williams-Jones et al, 2014). If it is admitted that cyber security differs from conventional security, it is also logical to make a subsequent policy recommendation:…”

“…In the cyber security context, a basic political dividing line in the U.S. has historically manifested itself between trade promoters and nonproliferation advocates, although, in general, the U.S. cyber security politics and lobbying traits include numerous different institutions, companies, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). 6 Among the notable U.S. export control institutions are the Department of State and the Department of Commerce, the latter having traditionally been the main institution responsible for questions related to dual-use weapons (Burke, 2012;Diffie and Landau, 2007;Rajeswari, 1998;Seyoum, 2017;von der Dunk, 2009). The former has traditionally concentrated on military technology, national security, and foreign policy together with institutions such as the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and illustratively for underlining the policy complexity, even the Departments of Treasury and Energy (Evans and Valdivia, 2012;Rajeswari, 1998;Rowold and Ponting, 2015;Seyoum, 2017;Waltz, 2007).…”

“…6 Among the notable U.S. export control institutions are the Department of State and the Department of Commerce, the latter having traditionally been the main institution responsible for questions related to dual-use weapons (Burke, 2012;Diffie and Landau, 2007;Rajeswari, 1998;Seyoum, 2017;von der Dunk, 2009). The former has traditionally concentrated on military technology, national security, and foreign policy together with institutions such as the Departments of Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, and illustratively for underlining the policy complexity, even the Departments of Treasury and Energy (Evans and Valdivia, 2012;Rajeswari, 1998;Rowold and Ponting, 2015;Seyoum, 2017;Waltz, 2007). 7 Nevertheless, occasionally the fine balance between trade and security has been adjusted by concretely shifting export control responsibilities between the Departments of Commerce and State, respectively (Thomsen II and Paytas, 2001).…”

“…Although many of the items are listed with specific operational ranges, the definitions are still encompassing and imprecise. In general, this vagueness reflects the increasing problems with the concept of dual-use technologies (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2018;Rath et al, 2014;Rajeswari, 1998;Williams-Jones et al, 2014). Thus, to see the forest from the trees, it is better to again focus on the historical changes and amendments, augmented by the fundamental framings and exclusion criteria used in the Wassenaar Arrangement.…”

What is Behind the China Rule in 2007: Motivations for the Bush Administration’s Export Control Policy Against China

“…Noting that the competitiveness of international system measured by polarity accelerates technology adoption (Milner and Solstad 2021), international structure affects export control policy especially technology sector. The most studied case is Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (CoCom), a multilateral organization to control trade to Soviet countries, which transformative structure resulted in the elimination of the organization (Qingmin and Hyer, 2001;Clarke and Johnston 1999;Rajeswari 1998). Foreign availability or trade dependency are other structural factors to motivate export control policy (Mastanduno 1985;Kim 2017).…”