Highlights The paper is comparing the effect of currency board arrangements with other monetary/exchange rate regimes on the credibility of the monetary authority Answers to survey question about the expectations about the local currency stability are used as an indicator of the credibility of monetary authority The results suggest a positive effect of CBA on monetary author's credibility Additionally, the results imply that the positive effect of currency boards is greater the worse the expectations about economic prospects and the lower the trust in government
AbstractCurrency Boards are usually argued to increase the credibility of the monetary authority, although this effect ultimately depends on the economic, political and institutional circumstances in the specific country. Few studies have previously been able to address this issue empirically. Using a novel database, the analysis conducted in this paper finds that, other things being equal, the credibility of the monetary authority is likely to be higher in those European transition countries with currency board arrangements, namely Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria. The results also suggest that currency board arrangements are more likely to increase the credibility of the monetary authority in countries with a low level of trust in government and a weak economy. These findings imply that the maintenance of currency board arrangements in recent years in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Bulgaria may have been advantageous.