Verbal Reports on Mental Processes: Issues of Accuracy and Awareness

Rich, Marvina C.

doi:10.1111/j.1468-5914.1979.tb00412.x

Cited by 18 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Ericsson & Simon, 1980;Kraut & Lewis, 1982;Nisbett & Bellows, 1977;Nisbett & Wison, 1977;Rich, 1979;Smith & Miller, 1978;White, 1980). Indeed the RSA effect obtained in the present research supports the argument that people do have access to such information.…”

Section: Theoretical Implicationssupporting

confidence: 78%

Eyewitness identification: Retrospective self-awareness and the accuracy–confidence correlation.

Kassin

1985

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

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Research has shown that despite people's intuitive beliefs to the contrary, there is only a weak and inconsistent correlation between eyewitness identification accuracy and confidence. Four experiments were conducted in order to test the hypothesis that retrospective self-awareness (RSA) would increase this correlation. In all studies, subjects watched a staged crime; immediately afterwards, they were asked to identify the culprit from a photospread and to indicate their confidence in that judgment. In an RSA condition, subjects also viewed a videotape of their performance before rating their confidence. Collectively, the results showed an average correlation of .04 in the control groups and .48 in the RSA condition. In addition, the data tentatively supported a self-perception hypothesis that this manipulation is effective because it alerts subjects to valid but previously unobserved aspects of their own overt behavior (e.g., response latency). These findings are discussed for both their theoretical and forensic implications.

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Section: Theoretical Implicationssupporting

confidence: 78%

Eyewitness identification: Retrospective self-awareness and the accuracy–confidence correlation.

Kassin

1985

Journal of Personality and Social Psychology

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“…I will start with those instances people cannot be aware of. First, in agreement with other researchers it seems to me that mental processes, conceived as neurological processes or as theoretical constructs, cannot be introspected (e.g., Rich, 1979;Smith and Miller, 1978). No one can introspect in his body the biochemical reactions of the glandular and the nervous systems as they are described by the biochemical and physiological theories.…”

Section: Mental Processes and Introspection: A Clarificationmentioning

confidence: 58%

“…subjective reports about higher mental processes are sometimes correct" (p. 233). The flaw in this procedure is obvious-the AIC is ad-hoc and irrefutable, since correct self reports are considered to demonstrate the use of available theories, and thus do not provide counter-empirical examples for the AZC (e.g., Rich, 1979;Smith and Miller, 1978). The issue at stake, however, is more complex, since it relates to the general question of what counts as an appropriate psychological explanation.…”

Section: How the Anti-introspective Conclusion Is Reached Its Logicamentioning

confidence: 98%

Hypothesizing from Introspections: A Model for the Role of Mental Entities in Psychological Explanation ¹

Rakover

1983

J Theory Soc Behav

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For many years, research in cognitive and social psychology has emphasized the importance of the subject's awareness of his-own mental entities (measured by introspection) for the explanation of human behavior. Recently, Nisbett and Wilson (1977b) have come to a provocative antiintrospectivist conclusion (AIC). Based on a review of experimental evidence, they suggest that (a) people have little or no access to their own mental processes, and (b) when people do try to explain their own behavior, they base their explanations on existing available theories instead of their introspections. Here is a summary of their major points: "Evidence is reviewed which suggests that there may be a little or no direct introspective access to higher order cognitive processes. Subjects are sometimes (a) unaware of th-e existence of a stimulus that importantly influenced a response, (b) unaware of the existence of the response, and (c) unaware that the stimulus has affected the response. It is proposed here that when people attempt to report on their cognitive processes, that is, on the processes mediating the effects of a stimulus on a response, they do not do soon the basis of any true introspection. Instead their reports are based on a priori, implicit causal theories, or judgement, about the extent to which a particular stimulus is a plausible cause of a given response."(P. 231)The purpose of this paper is (a) to isolate the flaws in the way Nisbett and Wilson reached the AIC and the "available theory" thesis, and (b) to develop an alternative model-the "hypothesizing from introspections" (HI) model-which emphasizes the possibility of a person's access to his mental entities. The article emphasizes the following points: First, a brief clarification of Nisbett and Wilson's differentiation between mental processes and mental contents will be given (for the sake of clarity I will use the term mental entities as a general category for what people can become aware 09.Second, the way in which Nisbett and Wilson reached the AIC and the logical structure of their arguments will be described. Third, based on Nisbett and Wilson's differentiations between the subject's awareness of the 2 12 Sam S. Rakover stimulus, the response, and the processes by which one leads to the other, a model is developed according to which the subject is conceived of as a scientist who plans his internal observations and who hypothesizes from his mental entities. Fourth, some of Nisbett and Wilson's experiments will be reanalyzed from the point of view of the proposed model. Finally in the light of the HI model, Nisbett and Wilson's non-self report criterion for determining the subject awareness will be discussed.Nisbett and Wilson's paper has generated many criticisms, most of them are methodological (e.g., Smith and Miller, 1978;White, 1980;Adair and Spinner, 1981). In comparison, the present paper presents on the one hand a philosophical critique, and on the other an alternative model-the HI model-which accounts for Nisbett and Wilson's empirical results.

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“…Although the access proposition carries the qualifying phrase ' may be little ', the force of the proposition is that 'introspective access ' is restricted to products, contents and 'interim results ' of processes, and processes themselves are beyond the reach of 'introspective access'. Nisbett & Wilson do not define the term 'process' (Ericsson & Simon, 1980;Rich, 1979;White, 1980). They do list a number of things that they regard as content or product (and therefore 'introspectively accessible ').…”

Section: The Distinction Between Process and Contentmentioning

confidence: 99%

Knowing more about what we can tell: ‘Introspective access' and causal report accuracy 10 years later

White

1988

British J of Psychology

144

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Nisbett & Wilson (1977a) proposed that people lack ‘introspective access' to their mental processes, and that retrospective causal reports about those processes are in general inaccurate. This paper reviews the literature subsequent to that proposal. This literature has established that: (i) the term ‘process' lacks clear, adequate and valid definition; (ii) the proposal depends upon an untested assumption that verbal reports are valid indicators of ‘introspective access’; (iii) knowledge of the process is not sufficient for an accurate report about causal relations between stimuli and responses. Hypotheses about causal report accuracy can be tested, but there are severe methodological difficulties associated with measures of actual effects, the conditions under which retrospective causal reports are given and the use of ‘observer’ groups to rule out specific sources of information. Of the recent studies, none has achieved unambiguous support for, or falsification of, even a weak form of the proposal. There is no justification at present for using the proposal to interpret null results on verbal report measures. Some issues of broader significance are discussed, including the usefulness of verbal reports in research, the place of cultural beliefs in theoretical statements, and the social and practical context of verbal reports.

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Verbal Reports on Mental Processes: Issues of Accuracy and Awareness

Cited by 18 publications

References 14 publications

Eyewitness identification: Retrospective self-awareness and the accuracy–confidence correlation.

Eyewitness identification: Retrospective self-awareness and the accuracy–confidence correlation.

Hypothesizing from Introspections: A Model for the Role of Mental Entities in Psychological Explanation ¹

Knowing more about what we can tell: ‘Introspective access' and causal report accuracy 10 years later

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Verbal Reports on Mental Processes: Issues of Accuracy and Awareness

Cited by 18 publications

References 14 publications

Eyewitness identification: Retrospective self-awareness and the accuracy–confidence correlation.

Eyewitness identification: Retrospective self-awareness and the accuracy–confidence correlation.

Hypothesizing from Introspections: A Model for the Role of Mental Entities in Psychological Explanation 1

Knowing more about what we can tell: ‘Introspective access' and causal report accuracy 10 years later

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Hypothesizing from Introspections: A Model for the Role of Mental Entities in Psychological Explanation ¹