‘We Chose Africa’: South Africa and the Regional Politics of Cooperation with the International Criminal Court

Boehme, Franziska

doi:10.1093/ijtj/ijw024

Cited by 11 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…(Rachovitsa 2019, 279) Like the Inter-American Court, the ACtHPR has in practice exercised a "quasicriminal" jurisdiction, although to a lesser extent than its Inter-American counterpart (Viljoen 2019, 318). Furthermore, as is well documented elsewhere, the AU has presented a multidimensional challenge to the ICC's authority on the continent (Boehme 2017). One development that can be understood as part of this challenge is the 2014 adoption by the AU Assembly of the Malabo Protocol, which willif and when it enters into forceexpand the African Court's jurisdiction to include criminal cases ("Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights" Not in force).…”

Section: Africa: the Authority Dimension Of Governancementioning

confidence: 85%

Regionalized Governance in the Global South

Coe

Nash

2023

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This Element addresses questions of division of labor and concentration of authority among intergovernmental organizations by examining multilevel governance in the Global South. It focuses on the policy domains of peace and security and human rights in Africa and Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC), and its central finding is that the extent of governance regionalization varies across regions and issue areas. In the domain of peace and security, governance is most regionalized in Africa. In the domain of human rights protection, governance is most regionalized in the LAC region. Given the phenomenon of regional specialization, the Element makes the case for the greater explanatory power of regional drivers of regional institutional development. This Element is also available as Open Access on Cambridge Core.

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Section: Africa: the Authority Dimension Of Governancementioning

confidence: 85%

Regionalized Governance in the Global South

Coe

Nash

2023

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“…Others like Brazil and South Africa, which had markedly higher democracy scores in 2003, resisted the U.S. pressure, resulting in significant loss of economic and military aid (e.g. Boehme (2017)). A simple bivariate analysis also reveals that the countries that signed these agreements had dramatically worse democracy records than countries which refused to sign them.…”

Section: Us-costa Rica: the Icc Problemmentioning

confidence: 99%

When Do Imposed Sanctions Work? The Role of Target Regime Type

Zarpli

2022

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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A number of studies on sanction effectiveness have highlighted the importance of regime type and how it affects the sensitivity of sanctioned states (target) to the economic costs of sanctions. The scholarly consensus holds that mainly because of their responsiveness to domestic audiences, democratic regimes are most likely to give in to the demands of the sanctioning state (sender). I argue that regime type is important not only in influencing leaders’ sensitivity to economic costs—which create incentives to back down—but also to the audience costs—which create incentives to stand firm. I argue that taking the audience cost into account would lead to different predictions about the effect of democracy. Particularly, I argue that the effect of democracy is inverted- U shaped, where full democracies have no higher likelihood of meeting the demands of the sender than mixed (hybrid) regimes. Using a newly released dataset on economic sanctions between 1950-2020, I find robust support for my argument.

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“…Similarly, in South Africa President Jakob Zuma's basis for domestic populist mobilization long relied on anti-Western and pan-African rhetoric (Guha 2013). Zuma has also been embroiled in a series of struggles with a strong and independent Constitutional Court (Parpworth 2017), including over the arrest of the indicted Sudanese President Omar Bashir during his visit to South Africa (Boehme 2017). As mentioned before, the Court declared the government's declaration to leave the Rome Treaty a violation of the constitution.…”

Section: Minority Rights and Identitymentioning

confidence: 99%

Populism and Backlashes against International Courts

Voeten¹

2019

Perspect. polit.

107

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International courts, like domestic courts, protect liberal limits on majoritarianism. This sometimes puts these courts in a position to protect the property rights of the "corrupt elites" that are targeted by populists or the civil liberties of those who are targeted in domestic populist identity politics. Moreover, populism offers an ideology to attack the authority of a court rather than just its individual rulings. An empirical examination illustrates the plausibility of this argument. A large number of backlashes against international courts arise from judgments that reinforce local populist mobilization narratives. Populist backlashes against international courts are not just about sovereignty but often follow efforts to curb domestic courts, usually for similar reasons. Yet populist backlashes do not always succeed, either because populist leaders do not follow up on their exit threats or because populism is too thin an ideology for creating successful multilateral reform coalitions.

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‘We Chose Africa’: South Africa and the Regional Politics of Cooperation with the International Criminal Court

Cited by 11 publications

References 0 publications

Regionalized Governance in the Global South

Regionalized Governance in the Global South

When Do Imposed Sanctions Work? The Role of Target Regime Type

Populism and Backlashes against International Courts

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