What is Absolute Necessity?

Abstract

Résumé : On pourrait définir la nécessité absolue comme la vérité dans absolument tous les mondes possibles sans restriction. Mais nous devrions être capables de l'expliquer sans invoquer les mondes possibles. J'envisage trois dé-finitions alternatives de : « Il est absolument nécessaire que p » et défends une définition contrefactuelle généralisée : ∀q(q p). Je montre que la nécessité absolue satisfait le principe S5 et soutiens que la nécessité logique est absolue. Je discute ensuite des relations entre la nécessité logique et la nécessité méta-physique, en expliquant comment il peut y avoir des nécessités absolues non logiques. J'esquisse également une théorie essentialiste selon laquelle la nécessité a son fondement dans la nature des choses. Je discute certaines de ses consé-quences, y compris concernant l'existence nécessaire de certaines propriétés et celle de certains objets.Abstract: Absolute necessity might be defined as truth at absolutely all possible worlds without restriction. But we should be able to explain it without invoking possible worlds. I consider three alternative definitions of 'it is absolutely necessary that p' and argue for a generalized counterfactual definition: ∀q(q p). I show that absolute necessity satisfies the S5 principle, and argue that logical necessity is absolute. I discuss the relations between logical and metaphysical necessity, explaining how there can be non-logical absolute necessities, and sketch an essentialist theory according to which necessity is grounded in the natures of things, and discuss some of its consequences, including the necessary existence of certain properties and objects.

On Modal Knowledge

“…This view, in line with a long tradition running from Aristotle to the present day with e.g., [Fine 1994], [Lowe 2007] and [Hale 2012], considers that the notion of essence or nature is fundamentally characterized in terms not of necessity but of identity. In this sense, a being F is a constitutive fact about a iff a being F makes a what it is.…”

“…Relative necessities, such as those expressed when we say: "I could not come on time to this appointment" or "objects with a mass cannot travel faster than the speed of light" are explained by the fact that, when they are submitted to the counterfactual test, the antecedent is filled by a restricted set of propositions, namely those that hold in the contextually relevant possibilities. When combined with an essentialist theory of modality [Hale 2012], this generalized counterfactual analysis of absoluteness has the serious advantage of accounting for the distinction between logical necessities and non-logical metaphysical necessities, without relativizing metaphysical modality or introducing a dualism between logical possibilities and metaphysical possibilities in the whole space of possibilities. An additional step consists in saying that metaphysical modality, and not just one of its properties (viz.…”

Naturalised modal epistemology and quasi-realism

“…More to the point, and it bears repeating, once we explain away this psychological necessity, which the quasi-realist is saying my argument inadvertently does, absolute necessities cease to be absolutely necessary: they become logically possible. Hence, C. This way of understanding "absolute necessity" corresponds to Hale's (2012) "maximalabsoluteness" conception of absolute necessity. He explains that a proposition p is maximalabsolutely necessary if "it implies, and so is at least as strong as, any other comparable kind of necessity" (Hale 2012, 121).…”

“…13 It is not clear which preceded the other between logical and metaphysical necessities. Hale (2012) thinks logical necessities precede metaphysical ones. But, see Shalkowski (2004) for why and how metaphysical necessities precede logical ones.…”

Against the reduction of modality to essence

“…conceptual, logical, nomic, or normative. See Fine (2002), Hale (1996Hale ( , 1999Hale ( , 2002Hale ( , 2012Hale ( , 2013, and Kment (2014) for more on the varieties of modality.…”