What Is Individualism in Social Ontology? Ontological Individualism vs. Anchor Individualism

Epstein, Brian

doi:10.1007/978-3-319-05344-8_2

Cited by 14 publications

(11 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Combining these ideas with some ideas already discussed yields a picture of human agents as socialized beings whose responses to the world are significantly conditioned by their local social-cultural-material context. Persons, on this view, are not simply sites of intentionality (even embodied sites of intentionality), and the social world does not just consist of sites of collective intentionality (Epstein 2014; Epstein 2009). I am a professor, a homeowner, a mother, a consumer; also a role model, a target of advertising, a political constituent.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Distinguished Lecture: Social structure, narrative and explanation

Haslanger

2015

Can. J. of Philosophy

131

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Recent work on social injustice has focused on implicit bias as an important factor in explaining persistent injustice in spite of achievements on civil rights. In this paper, I argue that because of its individualism, implicit bias explanation, taken alone, is inadequate to explain ongoing injustice; and, more importantly, it fails to call attention to what is morally at stake. An adequate account of how implicit bias functions must situate it within a broader theory of social structures and structural injustice; changing structures is often a precondition for changing patterns of thought and action and is certainly required for durable change.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Distinguished Lecture: Social structure, narrative and explanation

Haslanger

2015

Can. J. of Philosophy

131

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“…A ontologia social de Max Weber: uma releitura a partir do individualismo âncora de Brian Epstein A segunda deficiência da superveniência é solucionada quando Epstein ressalta a capacidade criadora dos indivíduos, ao invés de concebê-los como meras peças que compõem o mundo social. A ideia fundamental da ancoragem é a de que o mundo social é criado pelos indivíduos, pois somente eles têm capacidade de estabelecer princípios de ação, hábitos, práticas ou ideias (Epstein 2019(Epstein , 2014. Sob essa perspectiva, "as coisas têm propriedades sociais em virtude das pessoas concebê-las, tratá-las ou agir de uma certa maneira em relação a elas" (Epstein 2014, 6/12 Civitas 22: 1-12, jan.-dez.…”

Section: Carlos Eduardo Sell • Bruna Dos Santos Boldaunclassified

ontologia social de Max Weber

Sell

Bolda

2022

Civitas

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O artigo apresenta uma releitura da sociologia de Max Weber com base no individualismo âncora de Brian Epstein. Após apresentar a reflexão de Gert Albert sobre a ontologia de Weber, reconstruímos, em suas linhas gerais, os conceitos de anchoring e grounding da ontologia individualista de Epstein. Demonstramos, assim, que para Weber o nível social está “ancorado” nos indivíduos concebidos em sua dupla dimensão de seres biopsicológicos e socioculturais. Em relação ao “fundamento” [grounding] do social, mostramos que o conceito de ação com sentido pode ser lido como uma forma de projeção mental que encontra sua tradução coletiva na dimensão das relações sociais institucionalizadas [ordem social]. Dessa forma, a relação entre o nível institucional e o nível individual não é pensada em termos de causação direta, mas enquanto “dependência” [grouding].

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“…It is precisely this point which motivates various non-modal analyses of ontological dependence (Fine 1995(Fine , 1994Koslicki 2012Koslicki , 2013Tahko and Lowe 2016), including much of the recent work on metaphysical grounding. 13 Given this, one possibility is that the collective acceptance view can be revised by appeal to the notion of ground (Griffith 2018a(Griffith , 2018bEpstein 2013Epstein , 2014Epstein , 2015aEpstein , 2015bEpstein , 2016Schaffer 2017). 14 Grounding is a non-causal relation of dependence that holds between more and less fundamental entities.…”

Section: The Collective Acceptance Viewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Against Social Kind Anti-Realism

Mason

2020

Metaphysics

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The view that social kinds (e.g., money, migrant, marriage) are mind-dependent is a prominent one in the social ontology literature. However, in addition to the claim that social kinds are mind-dependent, it is often asserted that social kinds are not real because they are mind-dependent. Call this view social kind anti-realism. To defend their view, social kind anti-realists must accomplish two tasks. First, they must identify a dependence relation that obtains between social kinds and our mental states. Call this the Dependence Task. Second, they must show that social kinds are not real because they are mind-dependent. Call this the Anti-Realist Task. In this paper, I consider several different ways of defining the relation that is supposed to obtain between social kinds and our mental states. With respect to each relation, I argue that either it fails to accomplish the Dependence Task, or it fails to accomplish the Anti-Realist Task. As such, anyone who wishes to defend social kind anti-realism must provide an alternative explanation of how social kinds depend on our mental states in a way that impugns their reality. In the absence of such an explanation, there is no reason to endorse social kind anti-realism.

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What Is Individualism in Social Ontology? Ontological Individualism vs. Anchor Individualism

Cited by 14 publications

References 15 publications

Distinguished Lecture: Social structure, narrative and explanation

Distinguished Lecture: Social structure, narrative and explanation

ontologia social de Max Weber

Against Social Kind Anti-Realism

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