What’s Wrong with Social Simulations?

Abstract

This paper tries to answer the question why the epistemic value of so many social simulations is questionable. I consider the epistemic value of a social simulation as questionable if it contributes neither directly nor indirectly to the understanding of empirical reality. In order to justify this allegation I rely mostly but not entirely on the survey by Heath, Hill and Ciarallo (2009) according to which 2/3 of all agent-based-simulations are not properly empirically validated. In order to understand the reasons why so many social simulations are of questionable epistemic value, two classical social simulations are analyzed with respect to their possible epistemic justification: Schelling's neighborhood segregation model (Schelling, 1971) and Axelrod's reiterated Prisoner's Dilemma simulations of the evolution of cooperation (Axelrod, 1984). It is argued that Schelling's simulation is useful, because it can be related to empirical reality, while Axelrod's simulations and those of his followers cannot be related to empirical reality and therefore their scientific value remains doubtful. Finally, I critically discuss some of the typical epistemological background beliefs of modelers as expressed in Joshua Epsteins's keynote address "Why model?" (Epstein, 2008). Underestimating the importance of empirical validation is identified as one major cause of failure for social simulations.

Formal Models of Scientific Inquiry in a Social Context: An Introduction

“…Martini and Pinto 2016; Harnagel 2018; Frey and Šešelja 2018b). The emergence of such methodological questions has been closely related to discussions on the methodology and epistemology of highly idealized models in social and natural sciences (e.g., Boero and Squazzoni 2005;Alexandrova 2008;Hindriks 2008;Arnold 2014;O'Sullivan et al 2016, etc. ).…”

The computational philosophy: simulation as a core philosophical method

“…Excepting the Munich Center for Mathematical Philosophy, we are aware of no graduate programs in philosophy that require a modeling or programming course. Some philosophers have recently taken aim at the value of the agent-based models most common in philosophy (Arnold 2014 , 2015 , 2019 ; Thicke 2019 ). Finally, as modelers, we can attest to hearing the following complaint time and again: “Interesting, but why is your research philosophical ?” 3…”

Complexity in Multilingualism (Research)

“…Following Anzola, there was also a "back-reaction" from social science to complexity science roughly because the idea of complexity was extended or deepened. But it should also be noted that the whole enterprise of agent-based simulation has remained controversial, see Arnold (2014) for a critical voice. In a case study about the Ising model, which was first developed in statistical physics and later transferred to social science, Knuuttila and Loettgers (2016, p. 377) come to the result that "the insights gained by modelling socio-economic phenomena by the Ising model may remain limited."…”