Whistleblowing: Incentives and Situational Determinants

Abstract

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Recompensar la denuncia: apuntes para una política pública informada

“…Sin embargo, desde el ámbito de políticas públicas, el enfoque predominante sigue siendo el cálculo racional simple. Por un lado, nadie cuestiona ya que ofrecer una recompensa económica aumenta la cantidad de denuncias (Andon, Free, Jidin, Monroe y Turner, 2018; Franke, Moser y Simsons, 2016; Lee y Xiao, 2018;Mogielnicki, 2011;Nyreröd y Spagnolo, 2018;Pope y Lee, 2013;Rose et al, 2018;Schmolke y Utikal, 2016). No solamente porque la avaricia mueve al homo oeconomicus.…”

“…No solamente porque la avaricia mueve al homo oeconomicus. Varios autores consideran que un incentivo económico es justo porque compensa los costos percibidos y resuelve el dilema del bien común: la denuncia tiene beneficios sociales altos, pero los costos son principalmente personales (Ferzinger y Currell, 1999;Franke et al, 2016;Mogielnicki, 2011;Schmolke y Utikal, 2016). Los costos personacanal externo.…”

Peran Reward dan Komitmen Organisasi Terhadap Niat Whistleblowing: Sebuah Studi Eksperimen

“…Pemikiran ini sejalan dengan teori penguatan atau reinforcement theory yang mengasumsikan bahwa jika suatu tindakan diberikan reward atau imbalan maka individu akan termotivasi untuk melakukan tindakan tersebut. Sebagaimana hasil penelitian bahwa imbalan insentif keuangan dapat meningkatkan niat anggota organisasi melakukan whistleblowing (Andon et al, 2018;Pope & Lee, 2013;Schmolke & Utikal, 2016;Said et al, 2017). Berdasarkan argumentasi tersebut maka dirumuskan hipotesis pertama sebagai berikut: H1: Anggota organisasi akan cenderung melakukan whistleblowing jika ada reward.…”

Motivating Whistleblowers

“…The experimental study most closely related to ours is by Schmolke and Utikal (2016), who investigate whistleblowing in a neutrally framed environment where one subject may increase his payo¤ at the cost of increasing inequality among other players who can then report this behavior to a third subject, the potential whistleblower. Blowing the whistle leads to punishment and redistribution of payo¤s to restore initial conditions.…”