Who's to Blame? (Mis) perceptions of the Intergovernmental Response to Disasters

Abstract

This analysis shows that the intergovernmental response to Hurricane Katrina collapsed because those involved in the process did not have a clear understanding of their own roles and responsibilities or how the entire governmental response system should operate. New data are presented which demonstrate that citizens'attitudes about intergovernmental responsibilities coincide quite closely with how the disaster response system is designed to function, but they differ from the way public officials involved in the Hurricane Katrina relief efforts thought the process should work. This mismatch between what various levels of government are expected to do and what activities they actually perform in emergency situations has contributed to extremely negative impressions within the American public about governmental performance during natural disasters. In the United States, government is viewed as the only institution with the resources, authority, and capabilities to help citizens cope with large-scale cataclysmic events, like natural disasters. So, it is not surprising that the government assumed a major role in the response to Hurricane Katrina along the Gulf Coast in 2005. This hurricane represents one of the most intense and destructive storms to ever hit the United States (Blake, Rappaport, and Landsea 2007). Katrina affected 90,000 square miles of land across 138 counties and parishes in 4 states, created flooding conditions in 80 percent of the city of New Orleans, and led to the relocation of more than 800,000 residents (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2006). Katrina was responsible for more than 1,800 deaths, and over $100 billion in damages (O'Keefe 2007). Consequently, any governmental response, no matter how well orchestrated, would probably encounter serious difficulties dealing with such a large-scale, catastrophic event. But, the problems which have surfaced in the governmental response to Hurricane Katrina are not solely explained by its scope and magnitude. There have been other events very large in scope-for example, the 1993 Midwestern floods that affected millions of acres of farmland in nine states (Larson 1993)-which were handled much more smoothly and efficiently (Claiborne 1993; Ingwerson 1993;

Organizing for the Big One: A Review of Case Studies and a Research Agenda for Multi‐Agency Disaster Response

“…Another coordination problem is a lack of leadership, especially at the staff level, which can result from information overload or work overload (Helsloot, 2005;Linnenluecke et al, 2013), lack of mental resilience (Crichton et al, 2001;Schneider, 2008) or lack of expertise and experience (Parker, Stern, Paglia & Brown, 2009;Th evenaz et al, 2010). Lack of leadership leads to reactive or paralytic decision-making, poorly coordinated and ineffective action on ground, isolation and duplication of efforts and misplacement of resources (Lalonde, 2004;Olejarski et al, 2010).…”

Coerced Confusion? Local Emergency Policy Implementation After September 11

“…The rationale for a centralized emergency management and homeland security policy was to create a standardized approach in emergency preparedness and response with all actors using the same plans and protocols while working together to handle prevailing situations (Takeda and Helms 2006;Lester and Krejci 2007;Posner 2007;Department of Homeland Security 2008a,b;Jensen 2008). This would, in theory, eliminate problems that may arise from agency competition and the lack of clear lines of communication and control during disasters, as seen on September 11 and previous crisis situations (Wise 2002;Donley and Pollard 2002;Newmann 2002;Posner 2007;Schneider 2008). After all, any lack of coordination creates a conundrum for local emergency management officials in particular, especially when the time comes to prepare for and respond to any disastrous event.…”

Redundancy as a strategy in disaster response systems: A pathway to resilience or a recipe for disaster?

“…Backup, a form of redundancy in which units (e.g., resources, equipment, personnel) reside outside the system, but can be brought in and activated in times of need, was widely evident across all three incidents. Disasters frequently exceed local capacity to manage them (Scavo, Kearney, & Kilroy, ; Schneider, ). In our cases, personnel and equipment were constantly being brought in from outside the area in order to scale up to meet emergent needs as the incident evolved.…”