This article examines variability in policy priorities across the American states; that is, the ways that state governments allocate resources to meet societal needs. Specifically, our analysis uses 1992 data on state program expenditures to produce a comprehensive geometric representationor model-of state policy priorities for that year. This model is parsimonious, powerful, and substantively meaningful. The structure of state policy priorities is manifested as a sharp contrast between programs that deliver particularized benefits and those that supply collective goods. Furthermore, we show that policy priorities are largely determined by public opinion and interest group activity within the respective states. Therefore, our analysis not only operationalizes successfully a critical aspect of the policy process; it also makes a useful contribution to the study of state politics.

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This analysis shows that the intergovernmental response to Hurricane Katrina collapsed because those involved in the process did not have a clear understanding of their own roles and responsibilities or how the entire governmental response system should operate. New data are presented which demonstrate that citizens'attitudes about intergovernmental responsibilities coincide quite closely with how the disaster response system is designed to function, but they differ from the way public officials involved in the Hurricane Katrina relief efforts thought the process should work. This mismatch between what various levels of government are expected to do and what activities they actually perform in emergency situations has contributed to extremely negative impressions within the American public about governmental performance during natural disasters. In the United States, government is viewed as the only institution with the resources, authority, and capabilities to help citizens cope with large-scale cataclysmic events, like natural disasters. So, it is not surprising that the government assumed a major role in the response to Hurricane Katrina along the Gulf Coast in 2005. This hurricane represents one of the most intense and destructive storms to ever hit the United States (Blake, Rappaport, and Landsea 2007). Katrina affected 90,000 square miles of land across 138 counties and parishes in 4 states, created flooding conditions in 80 percent of the city of New Orleans, and led to the relocation of more than 800,000 residents (Federal Emergency Management Agency 2006). Katrina was responsible for more than 1,800 deaths, and over $100 billion in damages (O'Keefe 2007). Consequently, any governmental response, no matter how well orchestrated, would probably encounter serious difficulties dealing with such a large-scale, catastrophic event. But, the problems which have surfaced in the governmental response to Hurricane Katrina are not solely explained by its scope and magnitude. There have been other events very large in scope-for example, the 1993 Midwestern floods that affected millions of acres of farmland in nine states (Larson 1993)-which were handled much more smoothly and efficiently (Claiborne 1993; Ingwerson 1993;

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