Who Wants an Independent Court? Political Competition and Supreme Court Autonomy in the Argentine Provinces (1984–2008)

Leiras, Marcelo; Tuñón, Guadalupe; Giraudy, Agustina

doi:10.1086/678975

Cited by 40 publications

(29 citation statements)

References 46 publications

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“…Some authors assert that the possibility of turnover weakens the incentive to constrain judges (Finkel 2008;Ginsburg 2003;Leiras, Tuñón, and Giraudy 2015). If ruling parties know that they may become the opposition at some point in time, having a court that rules against incumbents may be a sort of political asset or insurance, which means that invasive actions are less likely.…”

Section: H5mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The evidence shows, for instance, that Latin American judges serve for consistently shorter periods of time than the duration of their formal terms (Basabe-Serrano and Polga-Hecimovich 2013; Leiras, Tuñón, and Giraudy 2015). In Africa there are cases of judges staying longer than the time that the formal rules stipulate (as in Madagascar, as discussed below).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…1 In a similar vein, Leiras et al (2015) distinguish between natural and political exits in their analysis of judicial departures at the subnational level in Argentina. The following section presents the theoretical argument and relevant hypotheses.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Ousted from the Bench? Judicial Departures in Consolidating Democracies

et al. 2017

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. their departures themselves but are rather forced to leave due to pressure from the elected branches. We undertook a cross-regional study of individual judicial departures in six consolidating democracies with elected presidents, three of them located in Latin America (Argentina, Chile, and Paraguay) and three in sub-Saharan Africa (Benin, Madagascar, and Senegal). We developed a unique data set containing information on 143 high-court judges in office since democratisation. We classified judicial departures as due and undue, and using a survival model we estimated the impact of institutional, political, personal, and contextual factors. The results indicate that undue judicial departures occur regardless of the region, but are most probable under the rule of politically powerful executives, and where there are lower levels of democracy and development. Terms of use: Documents in

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Section: H5mentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Ousted from the Bench? Judicial Departures in Consolidating Democracies

et al. 2017

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“…10 5 Chavez 2004;Helmke 2005;Iaryczower, Spiller, and Tommasi 2002;Magaloni and Sanchez 2006;Ríos-Figueroa 2007. 6 Basabe-Serrano and Polga-Hecimovich 2013; Lara Borges, Castagnola, and Pérez-Liñán 2012;Leiras et al 2011;Pérez-Liñán and Castagnola 2009. 7 Basabe-Serrano and Polga-Hecimovich 2013; Helmke 2005;Leiras et al 2011;Pérez-Liñán and Castagnola 2009;Ríos-Figueroa 2007;Sánchez, Magaloni, and Magar 2011;Skaar 2003.…”

Section: Explaining Judicial Turnovermentioning

confidence: 99%

“… 6 Basabe-Serrano and Polga-Hecimovich 2013; Lara Borges, Castagnola, and Pérez-Liñán 2012; Leiras et al 2011; Pérez-Liñán and Castagnola 2009. …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Judicial Instability and Endogenous Constitutional Change: Lessons from Latin America

Pérez‐Liñán¹,

Castagnola²

2014

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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Legal scholars frequently advocate institutional reforms to modernize the judiciary and promote judicial independence. However, constitutional reforms also offer an opportunity for politicians to reshuffle the high courts. The negative consequences of constitutional change for judicial stability are explored using an original database of Supreme Court and Constitutional Tribunal members in eighteen Latin American countries between 1904 and 2010. Because unobserved factors potentially explain constitutional replacement as well as judicial turnover, a two-stage event-history model has been employed. The analysis integrates two literatures, studies of constitution-making and studies of judicial politics. The results show that constitutional change is a significant cause of judicial instability and court manipulation, even after potential endogeneity has been taken into account.

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