With the inauguration of President John Biden, the ideas of “managing” competition between the United States and China increasingly began to appear in the lexicon of American politicians and pundits. Most works on US-China competition emphasize its non-military aspects, which does not reflect the efforts that the US puts into competition in the military-political domain, as well as the importance of its regulation in preventing armed conflict between the two powers. This study seeks to solve a dual task: firstly, to identify the ideational content of the concept of "managed competition", and secondly, to analyze the existing formats of managing US-China military-political competition in the Asia-Pacific region in the 21st century. After analyzing the academic and analytical works of recent years, the author concludes that the concept of "managed competition" comprises three components: 1) regulation of competition through institutionalization in order to increase the predictability, strengthen crisis management mechanisms and reduce conflict potential, 2) anticipatory programming of the actions of international actors by creating incentives and deterrents for making foreign policy decisions, 3) describing the measures necessary to achieve success in competition (outcompeting). At a practical level, the management of competition in the military-political relations between the United States and China implies 1) the creation of international institutions to reduce the like-lihood of military incidents in the South China Sea and the Western Pacific, 2) setting the agenda in the Asia-Pacific region (the concept of the "Indo-Pacific region"), the consolidation and expansion of US military-political institutions (QUAD, AUKUS) with giving them the anti-Chinese focus, 3) US actions that impede the implementation of PRC’s military-political goals: reunification with Taiwan, control over the South China Sea, expansion of military-political contacts with the countries of the Asia-Pacific region.