Vehicular Communication (VC) systems are on the verge of practical deployment. Nonetheless, their security and privacy protection is one of the problems that have been tackled only recently. In order to show the feasibility of secure VC, implementations are required. In [8] we have discussed the design of a VC security system that has emerged as a result of the European SeVeCom project. In this second paper, we discuss various issues related to the implementation and deployment aspects of secure VC systems. Moreover, we provide an outlook on open security research issues, which will arise as VC systems develop from today's simple prototypes to full-fledged systems.

Abstract-Characteristics and requirements of vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) differ quite significantly compared to standard ad hoc networks. Especially trust in VANETs is very important but still open issue, which will be addressed in this paper. We will describe, discuss and assess approaches and concepts that were proposed in ordinary fixed networks and mobile ad hoc networks and will show weak and strong spots. As basis for our considerations, we will describe a detailed automotive scenario, which relies on inter-vehicle communication for the exchange of safety relevant warning messages.

Communication using VANETs is commonly seen as the next milestone for improving traffic safety. Vehicles will be enabled to exchange any kind of information that helps to detect and mitigate dangerous situations. Security research in the past years has shown that VANETs are endangered by a plethora of severe security risk.Subject of this work is the modeling of attackers that target active safety applications in VANETs. Through a risk analysis, this work identifies assets, threats and potential attacks in inter-vehicle communication. The risk analysis shows that the most serious threat arises from a quasi-stationary (road-side) attacker that distributed forged warning messages. This attacker is discussed more deeply. We show the degrees of freedom that are available for position forging and find thereby two attacks that demand attention: single position forging having low effort compared to sophisticated movement path forging having a potentially high influence on road traffic safety. I. INTRODUCTIONVehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs) describe the technology of direct communication among vehicles themselves as well as among vehicles and (roadside) infrastructure. They enable vehicles to exchange information in order to increase vehicle passenger safety and road safety, traffic efficiency and driver convenience. Such information are enhancing autonomous in-vehicle safety systems as well as they are informing the driver of relevant events where his reaction or attention is required. Thus, the information received by a vehicle must be secure and reliable, meaning that information security is a crucial part of such a system. Information security and hence drivers' safety is endangered once there is a vulnerability in the system attracting attackers who exploit the vulnerability according to their motivation. For example, the open system character of VANETs might motivate attackers to interfere with the system. This interference may even provoke wrong driving maneuvers leading to an accident in the worst case.Attacks on VANETs have been summarized generally in previous work [1]. Several solutions have been proposed to secure the system against a variety of these attacks. What is missing so far is an in-depth discussion and analysis of attackers and the modeling of attacker behavior to analyze and to help to improve the proposed security solutions.The early stage of development of VANETs does not allow for a meaningful attack analysis. Currently, there are still too many options with respect to protocols and applications. Modeling all possible attacker behaviors and attacks on these would be impossible. Therefore, we reduce the options by

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