No abstract

O18, R11,

In this paper we present a new methodology by which regional employment forecasts can be spatially disaggregated to smaller administrative units. We develop a statistical model for disaggregating spatial data based upon related employment determinants (for example, the proximity of an area to a shopping centre), demonstrating there is a degree of spatial dependence and spatial heterogeneity in relationships. Applying an advanced statistical procedure, Geographically Weighted Regression (GWR), to account for these spatial effects this method utilises the locally fitted relationships to estimate employment numbers at the smaller geography whilst being constrained by the regional forecast. Results demonstrate that our GWR method generates superior estimates over a global regression model for spatially disaggregating regional employment forecasts.

Three major policy tools govern the demand for private health insurance (PHI) in Australia: premium-related subsidies (i.e. PHI-rebate); income tax surcharges (i.e. the Medicare Levy Surcharge (MLS)); and lifetime community-rating (i.e. Lifetime Health Cover). The first two provide a system of "carrots and sticks" to create incentives for increasing the demand for PHI. The third creates incentives for consumers to purchase PHI earlier than they otherwise would have, and to maintain this coverage over time even when prices rise. This paper makes a number of contributions to the existing literature. We develop a diagrammatic model that incorporates income heterogeneity and use it to consider two important policy issues: the effect of policy changes on consumer price responsiveness, and the effect of policy changes on the PHI take-up rates. The model suggests that recent changes to the income tax surcharge are likely to reduce the price elasticity of demand for insurance, which could have further consequences for outcomes in the PHI market and the health system more generally. Increases in premiums will reduce take-up, but could worsen the government's budget position, even if tax revenues were to rise. Finally, we conduct numerical simulations to examine the possible effects of recent policy changes, which are aimed at further means-testing the PHI rebate and the MLS. The simulation results suggest that these recently adopted policy changes are likely to reduce the take-up of PHI as well as consumers' responsiveness to future premium increases. The Geneva Papers (2012) 37, 725-744. doi:10.1057/gpp.2012.38 Keywords: private health insurance in Australia; regulation of health insurance markets; efficiency and affordability in health insurance markets; personal income taxation; premium and risk-related cross-subsidies; regulated competition Article submitted 10 February 2012; accepted 26 July 2012; published October 2012 IntroductionThe Australian health-care system features a public-private mix in health-care services financing and provision. Medicare is a universal tax-financed national health insurance scheme covering residents for the full costs of being treated as a public patient in a public hospital, and partly for medical and pharmaceutical costs. For private hospital charges, which are not covered by Medicare, individuals may The Geneva Papers, 2012, 37, (725-744) The public-private mix in health-care financing in Australia and the regulatory framework in the PHI market influence significantly the performance of PHI markets. For example, community rating and open enrolment regulations for PHI, which operate as legal restrictions to prevent risk-rating and selective underwriting by insurers, create incentives for (potentially significant) risk selection, which in the Australian context manifests itself mainly through the design of insurance products, for example premium differentiation via product differentiation.

Australia's carbon tax has been in place since July 2012. Following the 2013 federal election and change of government, it is likely that the tax will be abolished. This paper evaluates Australia's carbon tax experience and draws lessons for policymakers in other jurisdictions who may be considering following the Australian example and implementing their own carbon taxes or cap and trade schemes. Overall, the policy was poorly thought through, badly implemented, and lacked majority public support before it began. Australia's carbon tax experience is an interesting case study in how not to go about implementing climate change policy.JEL codes: H23, Q52, Q54.