No abstract

How do politicians respond to the policy priorities of the public in developing democracies? Do policymakers take into account their electoral mandate during their tenure in parliament? How does the relationship between media and politics work in a country that has a history of authoritarianism? The Turkish Policy Agendas Project aims to answer questions similar to these by providing systematic institutional data. The project content codes various parliamentary activities such as parliamentary debates, oral and written questions, parliamentary bills and laws. It also includes budget data dating back to the founding of the Turkish Republic. This chapter explains the construction of the dataset from data collection to coding, describes its features, and provides examples of possible applications.

We aim to address two weaknesses of the growing literature on legislative debate and legislative behaviour. First, most studies on legislative speech focus on the role of party unity and individual dissent on speech-making behaviour and largely ignore the role of legislators’ own calculations regarding their electoral vulnerability. Secondly, research on legislative behaviour that studies mechanisms other than legislative speech usually explores the role of electoral incentives where there is Single Member District (SMD) or open list system, and largely neglects closed list proportional representation systems with multi-member districts. We suggest that, similar to SMD and single transferable vote systems, the electoral vulnerability of individual legislators provides incentives to nurture a personal reputation and signals their efforts to their constituents and party leadership. Using a novel dataset of parliamentary speeches in the Turkish Parliament (2007–2011), we demonstrate that legislators who are electorally more vulnerable participate more in legislative debate, and are more likely to deliver constituency-related speeches.

Policymakers in democratic systems are expected to respond to the issue preferences of citizens and fulfill their electoral mandate as this responsiveness is central to democratic theory. Most empirical research on opinion-policy/program-policy linkage found a significant relationship between opinion and policy as well as program and policy. However, these studies have concentrated on a few developed Western countries with programmatic party systems. I focus on an emerging democracy with a highly clientelistic party system, Turkey, and address the following questions: Are policymakers' priorities driven by public opinion? Do parties take into account their electoral mandate in the legislature? To answer these questions, I use a novel dataset of parliamentary activities and public priorities in Turkey. I also offer an alternative method to measure party priorities which proves superior to the currently used measures.

Although a voluminous literature has studied the substantive representation of women, these studies have largely been confined to advanced democracies. Similarly, studies that focus on the relationship between Islam and women’s rights largely ignored the substantive representation of women in Muslim-majority countries. As one of the first studies of its kind, this article investigates the role of religion in the substantive representation of women by focusing on a Muslim-majority country: Turkey. Using a novel data set of 4,700 content coded private members’ bills (PMBs) drafted in the Turkish parliament between 2002 and 2015, this article synthesizes competing explanations of women’s representation in the Middle East and rigorously tests the implications of religion, ideology, critical mass, and labor force participation accounts. The results have significant implications for the study of gender and politics in Muslim-majority countries.