Using a sample of 27 countries between 1990 and 2014, we find that banks charge a higher interest rate on their loans when lending to firms that face more stringent environmental regulations. Further, we show that firms facing such regulations maintain lower financial leverage, incur more operating expenses, and have fewer banks participating in their loan syndicate. The results of the subsample analysis suggest that the increase in the cost of bank loans is more pronounced for financially constrained firms, firms in industries with high environmental litigation risk, and those located in bank-based economies. Overall, our results provide evidence that the observed higher loan spread is the result of environmentally sensitive lending practices by banks.

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We study the relationship between the cost of bank loans and the charges filed to the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) due to managerial interference in employee rights.Loans issued after the filing of the allegations are associated with significantly higher loan spreads than loans initiated before the filing of allegations. Strong allegations that result in withdrawal with adjustments or compliance tend to positively affect the loan pricing. Further, interfering firms tend to experience higher default risks in the years following the filing of charges. Our paper is the first in the literature to show the impact of violation of employee rights on the cost of bank loans, which has an implication for environmental, social, and governance (ESG) lending where loan contract terms are contingent on borrower ESG performance.