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Using a sample of 27 countries between 1990 and 2014, we find that banks charge a higher interest rate on their loans when lending to firms that face more stringent environmental regulations. Further, we show that firms facing such regulations maintain lower financial leverage, incur more operating expenses, and have fewer banks participating in their loan syndicate. The results of the subsample analysis suggest that the increase in the cost of bank loans is more pronounced for financially constrained firms, firms in industries with high environmental litigation risk, and those located in bank-based economies. Overall, our results provide evidence that the observed higher loan spread is the result of environmentally sensitive lending practices by banks.

We find that Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) actions (especially rate cuts) narrowed corporate credit spreads during the pre-crisis period of 2002-2007. During the 2008 crisis period, we find that both conventional cuts and quantitative easing decreased spreads. But FOMC inactions caused significant widening of spreads. The effects are especially large for speculative-grade and short-maturity bonds. Overall, the policy uncertainty during the crisis and macroeconomic theories during the pre-crisis period help to explain why FOMC announcements impacted credit spreads. The Fed's actions targeted at promoting growth and/or providing systemic liquidity were especially noted by the corporate bond market.

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