2021
DOI: 10.1016/j.irfa.2021.101859
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Corporate cash holdings, agency problems, and economic policy uncertainty

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Cited by 41 publications
(30 citation statements)
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“…We believe that this difference occurs because the company's motive to hold cash when uncertainty increases are divided into two. The first is the precautionary motive and the second is caused by the agency problem (Javadi et al, 2021). These two motives show contradictory results to each other.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 98%
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“…We believe that this difference occurs because the company's motive to hold cash when uncertainty increases are divided into two. The first is the precautionary motive and the second is caused by the agency problem (Javadi et al, 2021). These two motives show contradictory results to each other.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Under high uncertainty, there is a gap in the information held by external parties and managers about the company. Moreover, a higher information asymmetry problem will increase a firm's agency problems (Javadi et al, 2021). Excess cash holding can cause managers to take detrimental actions such as overinvestment or pursuing personal gain.…”
Section: Discussionmentioning
confidence: 99%
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“…By contrast, shareholders prefer dividends over retained earnings to reduce excessive cash under managers' control. According to Javadi et al (2021), lower cash holding in the face of higher policy uncertainty disciplines the managers to be more prudent in the use of the firm's resources. In this context, managers will tap into capital markets to fund future investments, which will expose them to subsequent monitoring by the market.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…As argued by Attig et al (2021), firms are likely to be more vulnerable to agency problems of FCF during high EPU and GPR periods because these periods are associated with decreased real economic activities (Baker et al, 2016) and hinders investment opportunities (Javadi et al, 2021). This in turn will increase cash reserves, which can be easily expropriated by mangers and turned into private benefits.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%