Contemporary active labour market (ALM) reforms are pivotal in the reorganization of the welfare state as they challenge and threaten some of the fundamental achievements of labour in capitalist societies: social programmes and entitlements that compensate for unemployment, and governance arrangements in which the social partners share authority and responsibility with the state. Consequently, ALM reforms may give raise to social unrest and political struggle that involves the state (the main proponent of ALM reforms), trade unions and political parties. These conflicts are important in the politicization of reforms, i.e. raising public awareness of and engagement with controversies of welfare state change.In this article, we use a non-European perspective to ask more generally how distinct historical institutions create separate 'politicization trajectories' of ALM reforms, which in turn produce different policy designs and outcomes. Centring on the case of Israel, in which historically 'abnormal' class politics fostered indifference to the reform in both trade unions and political parties, we maintain that the preliminary de-politicization made it possible for bureaucrats to control the reform, leading to an intra-state conflict between competing agencies over its design and implementation.

International organizations play a central role in disseminating social investment ideas, which serve to legitimize forms of public spending by stressing their future contribution to human capital and economic growth. However, the transition from a neoliberal to a social investment state is conditioned on national policymakers’ will to embrace a post-neoliberal macroeconomic philosophy and governance. Although such change lies in the professional purview of economist-technocrats, there is little empirical research on their role as national translators of social investment ideas. This article examines economists’ role in the translation of social investment ideas in Israel. By embedding specific social investment ideas within entrenched economic world views – including principles of ‘responsible’ macroeconomic governance – camps of Israeli economists articulate varying and sometimes competing social investment policy agendas. Lessons from Israel suggest that economists are non-negligible actors in the translation of social investment ideas. By advancing different social investment strategies, economists may assume different roles in the policymaking and politics of social investment.

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The translation perspective explores the travel of policy ideas, programmes and practices across international boundaries, focusing on the process through which interpretative agents introduce and adjust borrowed policy items to a new policy context. Current research emphasises the significance of local networks’ support for translation's efficacy. However, we know little about how such networks are maintained and stabilized over time or how changing configurations and capacities may affect translation's prospects. This paper explores the case of Israel's attempted institutionalisation of workfare – an enduring international policy fashion – from 1998 to the present day. We follow the stabilization and destabilization of the local translation network across different levels and sites of policy design and implementation, analysing emerging conflicts and agreements at each site. We use the metaphor ‘episodes of translation’ to explore translation's value as a concept accounting for local policy change. In order for translation-led policy change to maintain legitimacy and actualisation in contested domains, ongoing engagement of existing and emerging policy actors is essential. This case demonstrates how when networks become destabilized, translation-led policy change may come to a halt.

Along with the trend toward “New Public Management” (NPM) and replacing the legal culture of public bureaucracies with market logic through privatization, we are also witnessing instances of “publicization,” the application of public law norms and mechanisms to privatized services. The article explores the role of government lawyers and economists in the dynamics of these administrative reforms. Using a detailed case study of welfare‐to‐work reform in Israel, it shows that the reconstruction of decision making and accountability patterns under NPM was the result of competing efforts by these professional groups to appropriate the “privatized state” to accord with their own institutional logics and interests. While economists advanced a “market” logic, lawyers tried to reproduce the logic of “law” in the post‐bureaucratic setting. The study demonstrates how eventually public law norms were re‐infused into privatized welfare as a result of the increasing institutional power of the lawyers in the regulatory space, along with wider political and social support for the entrenched legalistic mechanisms of the administrative state. However, in addition to the “battle of norms” between lawyers and economists, there were also concessions that led to the redrawing of the boundaries of public law along more functional, rather than formal, lines.