Since 2001 investors have purchased rent-regulated housing in New York City with heightened expectation for financial performance, placing pressure on tenants and communities through increasing rents, harassment, eviction, and when financial targets are not met, physical deterioration of buildings. At the heart of this investment strategy is fictitious capital, the extension of credit based on assumptions about future events. This paper shows that beyond assessments about the “truth” or rationality of the expectations underlying fictitious capital, the management of value as a problem is at stake. When the expectations underlying fictitious capital are not realized, a network of actors engage in a set of legal–financial practices to manage the value of rent-regulated multifamily buildings, including banking regulation and its exception, mortgage securitization and special servicing, distressed debt markets, rent stabilization, and foreclosure law. The breakdown of the assumptions of fictitious capital reveals new challenges and opportunities for tenant activism and policy to intervene in preserving rent-regulated housing. The paper focuses on how this financialization of housing not only serves as a moment for the increasing role of financial actors and imperatives, but also how it drives tenant activism and policy to engage legal–financial practices to redefine the tenant–landlord relationship and to tie financial expectations more closely to the material reality of tenants and communities.

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Charter school advocates see the infusion of market competition into the educational sector as a means to achieving greater efficiency, effectiveness, and equity. Within this framework, consumer demand is understood to regulate the charter sector. This article challenges the adequacy of this premise, arguing that the structure of the financing of charter schools plays a decisive, if not determining, role in directing growth. Drawing on an analysis of the financing that enabled the dramatic growth of the UNO Charter School Network (UCSN) in Chicago during the 2000s, the article explores the implications of speculative borrowing and spiraling debt burdens on charter schools and on the functioning of the charter sector more broadly. The analysis reveals that (1) new debt was increasingly used to retire existing debt, (2) the structure of new financing assumed continued growth, and (3) schools within the network were yoked together as revenue from existing—and anticipated—schools was pledged to repay new debt.

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