Purpose This paper aims to investigate whether the Sarbanes-Oxley Act: Section 404(b) exemption caused an increase in auditor changes due to changes in expectations for both auditors and their clients. Design/methodology/approach This paper predicts that this exemption caused a significant amount of auditor changes post-exemption, due to a change in expected future economic rents (audit scope demands) for auditors (clients). Logistic regression analysis is used to examine whether auditor changes increased for non-accelerated filers (public companies with less than $75 million in public float), who were affected by this exemption, compared to auditor changes for accelerated filers (public companies with greater than $75 million in public float), who were not affected by this exemption. Findings The results show a significant positive association between the exemption and auditor dismissals for non-accelerated filers compared to that of accelerated filers. This finding is robust when sensitivity tests are used. Practical implications Prior literature finds that an increase in auditor changes can have various positive and negative effects on the affected companies. Thus, investors will be interested in the results of this paper when making their investment decisions with regard to non-accelerated filers. Social implications The results of this paper will aid policymakers as they consider the pros and cons of this exemption, as it pertains to the affected companies. Originality/value This paper is the first to study the effects of this exemption on auditor turnover for the affected companies.

This paper explores the question: "How does a client's information technology (IT) capability influence audit pricing?" Company data for the years 2004 through 2012 are employed. Firms appearing on the InformationWeek 500 (IW500) annual list of U.S. organizations with superior IT functions serve as a proxy for companies with superior IT capability. Our findings suggest that companies with superior IT capabilities incur higher levels of audit fees. In addition, as client size increases, the audit fees of firms with advanced IT capabilities increase at a greater rate than firms without such capabilities. These findings contrast with prior research by Chen et al. (2014) that found in the immediate post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) period for the years 2004 through 2007, client IT capability reduced audit fee increases. In addition, we replicate the Chen et al. (2014) results and find that IT capability did not influence audit fee increases during the sub sequent recession and recovery periods. Further, superior capability clients see smaller audit fee increases when exogenous shocks such as SOX regulations occur. These results suggest a revised interpretation of Chen et al. (2014) may be warranted. This study contributes to the literature by providing a more complete picture of how a client's IT capability affects audit fees. Prior research has studied the effect of IT capability on the external audit. This work focused exclusively on the immediate post-Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX) period. Masli et al. (2010) suggest that specific IT investments in internal control-monitoring technology reduce the rate of audit fee increase. Also, during the immediate post-SOX period, for the years 2004 through 2007, companies with strong IT capabilities had slightly lower (9.1%) rates of audit fee increase than those without strong IT resources (Chen et al., 2014). We argue, however, that these findings may not extend beyond the immediate post-SOX era when public audit failures (for example, Enron Corporation, WorldCom, Tyco International, Adelphia Communications Corporation) generated severe market and regulatory responses, leading companies to deploy IT resources specifically targeted to addressing audit and internal control risks. Additionally, we are unaware of any research that explores how the client's IT capability impacts the actual level of audit fees incurred. This paper addresses the gap in prior research by exploring the broader question: How does a client's IT capability impact audit pricing? The COBIT 5 (Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology) framework recommends that firms align, plan and organize IT investments in support of their chosen business strategy (ISACA, 2017). Firms may gain sustainable advantage by uti lizing IT to develop business capabilities that are difficult for competitors to imitate or acquire (Mata et al., 1995). In particular, firms generate value by aligning their internal capabilities with their IT strategy, creating synergistic resources to respond to market, industry and s...

Purpose This paper aims to investigate whether the expected implementation of Section 404(b) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX 404(b)) (the integrated audit requirement) caused auditors to discount their audit fees for non-accelerated filers in anticipation of expected increased future economic rents (DeAngelo, 1981) from those clients. Design/methodology/approach This paper predicts that auditors charged their non-accelerated filer clients lower audit fees during the years 2005-2007 (in anticipation of increased expected future economic rents from the implementation of the SOX 404(b) requirement) compared with the years 2010-2012 (when it had been determined that non-accelerated filers were permanently exempt from complying with SOX 404(b)). The authors use ordinary least squares regression analysis to examine whether audit fees increased significantly for non-accelerated filers after the permanent exemption announcement. Findings The results show a significant positive association between the exemption announcement and audit fees, supporting the theory that auditors discounted their audit fees for non-accelerated filers in the pre-exemption announcement period. This finding is robust when sensitivity tests are used. Practical implications The findings of audit fee discounting literature related to the post-SOX period are mixed. This study adds to this stream of literature by supporting the notion that audit fee discounting is being practiced post-SOX and is a potential unintended consequence of SOX 404 and the exemption. Thus, investors will be interested in the results of this paper when making their investment decisions with regard to non-accelerated filers. Social implications The results of this paper show that, even in the post-SOX environment, auditors will employ the use of audit fee discounting if a change in regulation incentivizes it. This commentary on the present state of the audit pricing market should be of interest to audit pricing policymakers. Originality/value This paper is one of the first to study audit fee discounting outside the realm of initial audit engagements.

Purpose This paper aims to investigate the effect that ownership structure (public vs private) has on the demand for high-quality auditors, specifically in the US banking industry. Design/methodology/approach The authors predict that public banks are more likely to hire a high-quality auditor than private banks and pay a higher audit fee premium for that high-quality auditor (due to higher agency costs, more demand for financial information and higher litigation risk). The authors analyze 2008–2014 banking data from the Federal Reserve using probit and OLS regression analysis to examine if there is a higher probability that public banks choose higher quality auditors and pay higher audit fees when they do so. Findings The results show that private banks are less likely to hire Big 4 auditors and industry-expert auditors than public banks. The authors also find that both private and public banks pay higher audit fees for Big 4 and industry-expert auditors, and that public banks pay a higher premium for Big 4 auditors and industry experts than private banks. Research limitations/implications The findings may not be fully generalizable to other types of firms, as banking is a heavily regulated and complex industry. However, inferences from this study may be generalizable to other similar industries such as insurance or health care. Practical implications The results of this paper imply that public and private banks have differing priorities when hiring their financial statement auditor. This may be of interest to investors and auditing regulators. Social implications The findings of this paper underscore the value of hiring an industry-expert auditor in an industry that is highly complex and regulated. This may be of interest to managers and policymakers. Originality/value Due to data restrictions, the emphasis of prior literature on the banking industry has been on public banks. This study is the first to analyze the differences between public and private banks’ demand for audit services.

We investigate the cost of debt effects for firms that manage earnings per share (EPS) through abnormal share repurchases. Although prior research finds a significant cost of debt decrease for firms that meet earnings benchmarks, our results suggest that firms using the abnormal share repurchase strategy realize no cost of debt decrease associated with meeting earnings benchmarks. We find some evidence of a smaller decrease in cost of debt associated with measures of abnormal decreases in cash flows but weak evidence for measures that are cash flow increasing. We also find that the effect of using abnormal stock repurchases to meet earnings benchmarks leads to smaller reductions in the cost of debt when compared with the cost reduction when earnings benchmarks are met through accruals management. This study extends prior literature regarding the effects on the cost of debt through alternative strategies to meet earnings benchmarks and will be of interest to managers as they consider the impact of their managerial decisions.