This squib provides a theoretical discussion on the use of the terms semantics and pragmatics in Construction Grammar. In the literature, the difference between semantics and pragmatics is often conceptualized either in terms of conventionality or in terms of truth-conditionality (Huang 2014, 299). It will be shown that, even though constructionists claim that there is no semantics–pragmatics distinction, both these underlying concepts are central to the study of constructions. Therefore, the aim is twofold. First, in keeping with Cappelle (2017), it will be argued that constructionists should make more explicit the distinction between the two types of (encoded) meaning. Second, it will be shown that constructionists need to be more terminologically consistent and agree on how to use the terms semantics and pragmatics. Following Depraetere (2019), I will argue that the terms semantics and pragmatics are most explanatory when defined in truth-conditional terms. In this way, finer-grained understanding of the meaning of constructions can be achieved.

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Triglyceride, free fatty acid, free cholesterol and phospholipid components of total intramuscular lipids were assessed in the thigh of 7 1/2 week-old cockerels from two genetically fat and lean lines of broiler chickens. A slightly higher proportion of triglycerides and a lower level of phospholipids were found in chickens from the fat line, but these differences were not significant (P > 0.05). These data are compatible with the hypothesis that muscle lipid composition is a physiological constant.

This article sheds new light on the usage constraints of be able to, by combining empirical evidence from the British National Corpus (BNC, Davies 2004–) with theoretical insights on the semantics–pragmatics interface. First, we show that be able to does not, contrary to the general assumption, express only ‘ability’ but it shares most of the root meanings usually associated with the possibility modals can and could (Coates 1983: 124). The data analysis shows that what is called ‘opportunity’ in Depraetere & Reed's (2011) taxonomy is the most frequent meaning of be able to. We then turn to the notion of actualisation, which is often claimed to be the main distinguishing feature between be able to and can/could. The qualitative analysis of the BNC dataset provides the empirical evidence, lacking in previous research, for the claim that actualisation is indeed a defining property of the modal periphrastic form. Starting from a reassessment of the semantics–pragmatics interface in terms of a fourfold distinction, we argue that actualisation is a generalised conversational implicature and constitutes conventional pragmatic meaning (that is, conventional non-truth-conditional meaning).

The goal of this paper is to investigate the possibility of a cross-theoretical understanding of coercion, a “kind of contextual enrichment/adjustment” (Lauwers & Willems 2011: 1220), by combining insights from Construction Grammar and Relevance Theory. In Construction Grammar, coercion has mostly been discussed in terms of the semantics of the linguistic items that occur in the sentence and how these interact with each other. Relevance Theory, on the other hand, does not distinguish cases of coercion from other instances of lexical adjustment, and discusses them in terms of the pragmatic principles involved during utterance interpretation. In order to highlight the complementarity of the two perspectives, this paper particularly consists in pinning down their respective explanatory limits. It will be shown that coercion is better described in terms of a linguistically required pragmatic process. Therefore, it will be suggested that coercion might actually instantiate a particular type of saturation.