The theoretical explanation for the industrial diversification-city size relationship is studied. As an explanation on the basis of variation in factor prices is not adequate, attention is paid to the theory of agglomeration economies, which offers a framework for a consistent theoretical explanation of the industrial diversification-city size and the industrial share-city size relationships. The results of some empirical research into the agglomeration economies-city size relationship are reviewed. Two econometric models are formulated of the industrial diversification-city size and the industrial share-city size relationships in Yugoslavia. The estimation of these models (based on 1981 data) gives evidence to support the hypothesis that there is a statistically significant relationship between city size and industrial diversification/share.

RezimeCilj ovog rada je da odgovori na pitanje da li postoji velika, fundamentalna alternativa postojećem načinu finansijskog posredovanja koja može da ubrza privredni rast. Pokazalo se da ne postoji velika kontroverza u pogledu uzročno-posledične veze kojom finansijsko posredovanje pospešuje privredni rast. Pokazalo se da regulacija treba da bude ex ante, sa unapred definisanim pravilima, da bude selektivna, usredsređena na finansijske institucije koje stvaraju najveći rizik, ali i da bude jednostavna, kako bi se lako ustanovili da li ispunjeni regulatorni zahtevi. Nove ideje u tom pogledu usmerene su ka umanjivanju leveridža, što vodi umanjenju kreditnog potencijala, ali i povećanju stabilnosti sistema. Male i srednje razvijene zemlje ne treba da budu inovativne na planu regulacije finansijskog sektora, već da pažljivo prate razvoj regulatornih instrumenata u svetu. Velika, fundamentalna alternativa postojećem načinu finansijskog posredovanja koja može da ubrza privredni rast ne postoji Ključne reči: finansijsko posredovanje, finansijski sistem, privredni rast, regulacija, bankarski sistem JEL: G20, G21, G28, O42 Primljen: 25.01.2017. Prihvaćen: 06.02.2017 SummaryThe aim of the paper is to explore whether there is a fundamental alternative to the incumbent pattern of financial intermediation that could accelerate the economic growth. It was demonstrated that there was no substantial controversy regarding the causality in terms of financial intermediation facilitating the economic growth. The regulation should be ex ante, with rules specified in advance, it should be selective, focused on those financial institutions that generate the biggest risk, but also simple, so that it is easy to establish whether the regulatory requirements have been breached or not. New ideas in regulation are focused on reducing the leverage, with the reduced lending capacity as the consequence, but also the improved stability of the system. Small countries at the middle level of development should not be innovative in the financial regulation, but carefully monitor the development of new regulatory instruments in the world. There is no fundamental alternative to the incumbent pattern of financial intermediation that could accelerate the economic growth.Keywords: financial intermediation, financial system, economic growth, regulation, banking system JEL: G20, G21, G28, O42 UvodCilj ovog rada je da razmotri odnos finansijskog posredovanja i privrednog rasta iz specifičnog ugla, tako da odgovori na pitanje da li postoji velika, fundamentalna alternativa postojećem načinu finansijskog posredovanja. Ovakav cilj rada uslovio je i njegovu strukturu. Prvo će se razmotriti odnos finansijskog posredovanja i privrednog rasta, uz usredsređivanje na najznačajnije moguće kontroverze na tom planu. Potom će se pažnja posvetiti nesavršenoj informisanosti kao najznačajnijem vidu nesavršenosti finansijskih tržišta, ukazujući na specifične pojavne oblike te nesavršenosti, poput neizvesnosti, rizika i asimetrije informacija, da bi se, nakon toga, ukaza...

Normally, privatisation is seen as beneficial. In the case of Serbia, the results are disappointing. This paper considers the failure of privatisation in Serbia-a latecomer in the matter-where privatisation was partly a result of exogenous pressures. In Serbia, a sizeable number of privatised firms were bought by bureaucrats and politicians and all firms were subjected to a period of supervision. We argue that this process of privatisation was designed to allow rentseekers to conserve their privileges through asset stripping and that this explains the failure. In order to do so, we perform empirical analysis of the determinants of liquidation, merger and bankruptcy of privatised firms from 2002 to 2015. We construct a novel data set from primary sources, free of the 'survivorship bias' and containing proxies for various types of owners, indirect signs of asset stripping strategy and a broad range of controls. Our results indicate that firms owned by politicians face significantly higher risks of bankruptcy, especially after the end of supervision.

No abstract

No abstract