The structure of subjective well-being has been conceptualized as consisting of two major components: the emotional or affective component and the judgmental or cognitive component (Diener, 1984; Veenhoven, 1984). The judgmental component has also been conceptualized as life satisfaction (Andrews & Withey, 1976). Although the affective component of subjective well-being has received considerable attention from researchers, the judgmental component has been relatively neglected. The Satisfaction With Life Scale (SWLS; Diener, Emmons, Larsen, & Griffin, 1985) was developed as a measure of the judgmental component of subjective well-being (SWB). Two studied designed to validate further the SWLS are reported. Peer reports, a memory measure, and clinical ratings are used as external criteria for validation. Evidence for the reliability and predictive validity of the SWLS is presented, and its performance is compared to other related scales. The SWLS is shown to be a valid and reliable measure of life satisfaction, suited for use with a wide range of age groups and applications, which makes possible the savings of interview time and resources compared to many measures of life satisfaction. In addition, the high convergence of self- and peer-reported measures of subjective well-being and life satisfaction provide strong evidence that subjective well-being is a relatively global and stable phenomenon, not simply a momentary judgment based on fleeting influences.

The relation between overly positive self-evaluations and psychological adjustment was examined. Three studies, two based on longitudinal data and another on laboratory data, contrasted self-descriptions of personality with observer ratings (trained examiners or friends) to index self-enhancement. In the longitudinal studies, self-enhancement was associated with poor social skills and psychological maladjustment 5 years before and 5 years after the assessment of self-enhancement. In the laboratory study, individuals who exhibited a tendency to self-enhance displayed behaviors, independently judged, that seemed detrimental to positive social interaction. These results indicate there are negative short-term and long-term consequences for individuals who self-enhance and, contrary to some prior formulations, imply that accurate appraisals of self and of the social environment may be essential elements of mental health.

We examined the effect of acquaintanceship on interjudge agreement in personality ratings. Approximately 150 undergraduates described their own personalities using the Q-sort. They were also described by two close acquaintances and by two "strangers" who knew them only via a single, spontaneous interaction viewed on videotape. The effect of acquaintanceship was powerful: Judgments by close acquaintances agreed with each other and with subjects' self-judgments much better than did judgments by strangers, even though strangers' judgments agreed with each other and with subjects' self-judgments beyond a chance level. This result implies that agreement among acquaintances' judgments must derive at least partly from experience with and observation of the person who is judged. The same traits that yielded better agreement among acquaintances also yielded better agreement among strangers and tended to be rated higher in subjective visibility, suggesting that people are intuitively knowledgeable about the traits they can judge with more and less agreement.

In a study exploring the cross-situational consistency of behavior, 140 undergraduate Ss were videotaped in each of 3 laboratory settings, and personality descriptions of these Ss were obtained from friends and acquaintances. Analyses focused on the degree to which Ss maintained consistent patterns of behavior across laboratory settings and between these settings and daily life. The following conclusions were reached: (a) Behavior can exhibit impressive consistency at the level of psychological meaning, (b) psychological properties of situations can be detected from their behavioral effects, (c) cross-situational consistency and discriminativeness are independent, and (d) some behaviors are more consistent than others.

The proposition recently offered by S. E. Taylor and J. D. Brown (1988) that positive illusions foster mental health has garnered considerable attention and acceptance. However, the significant theoretical and applied implications of their view for mental health require a critical evaluation of their argument. An examination of the logic and empirical evidence used to relate mental health to three key positive illusions--unrealistically positive views of the self, illusions of control, and unrealistic optimism--failed to substantiate Taylor and Brown's thesis. Further survey of more recent studies on positive illusions and mental health also failed to lend support to the Taylor and Brown generalization. Close consideration of several assumptions underlying the formulation raises further questions regarding their thesis. The present article concludes that it remains unproven that positive illusions foster mental health.